VULNERABILITY AND HUMANITARIAN IMPACT OF UN   SECURITY COUNCIL SANCTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN   

SUMMARY   REPORT

Prepared by the Office of the UN Humanitarian, Coordinator for Afghanistan, Islamabad, Pakistan, Aug 17, 2000

Index:

1. VULNERABILITY PROFILE
2. IMPACT OF SANCTIONS
3. CONCLUSIONS

Background 

From any perspective, Afghans face a dire situation.  They are war-weary and their resources are depleted from 21 years of armed conflict.  Even before the outbreak of hostilities, Afghanistan suffered from profound underdevelopment and grinding poverty; two decades of warfare have exacerbated this situation. Coupled with the edicts and prohibitions of a regime that imposes harsh restrictions on population movement, including in particular that of women, Afghans are also confronted with a fast-spreading drought.  In addition, aid agencies face formidable obstacles in their attempts to alleviate widespread suffering.  In the face of growing concern about a worsening economic situation and its implications for the well-being of vulnerable Afghans, a field investigation on vulnerability and the humanitarian implications of sanctions was undertaken in July and August 2000.[1]  This involved research and interviews with a wide cross-section of opinion including aid community personnel, economic actors, ordinary Afghans and with representatives of the Islamic Emirate (IEA) and the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA).

1.         VULNERABILITY  PROFILE

Impact of the Drought  

Most of the country is in the grip of a severe drought, considered to be the worst in 30 years. Assessments suggest that by June 2001 at least half of the populations of Afghanistan may be affected by drought including three to four million severely and another eight to twelve million moderately. So far the hardest hit have been the Kuchi nomads; some eighty per cent of their livestock is reportedly dead.  The drought has also caused the loss of 90 per cent of the crops in the majority of rain-fed areas while the rest of the crop quality is exceptionally poor this year.[2]  There have been reports of famine-related deaths in Hazarajat; given the difficulty of gaining access to the population in this area, there is growing concern about potential significant displacement from here and other drought-affected areas. Aid agencies have begun to report population movements to urban areas including in particular to Herat.  

Population Displacement  

Afghans refugees constitute HCR’s biggest caseload.  Iran and Pakistan host, respectively, 1.4 and 1.2 million Afghan refugees.  Both of these host nations promote repatriation and neither is enthused about the prospect of receiving new flows of refugees.[3]  Although HCR has a repatriation plan for refugees in Iran and Pakistan, Afghans do not return in large numbers given the continuing military conflict, the difficult economic situation, the on-going drought, limited social services and the policies of the authorities.  A 1999 HCR survey of 3, 270 returnee household heads found that 27% of returnees did not hold regular jobs, 21% found their houses “completely destroyed,” 14% faced problems with land mines or unexploded ordnance, as many as 46% did not have access to any kind of health services, and 79% of the families with school-age children did not have any kids at school.   In Afghanistan, a significant proportion of the urban population are people who have been displaced by different episodes of fighting.  Military offensives in 1999 resulted in the displacement of an estimated 200,000 Afghans. 

Depleted Coping Mechanisms  

The coping capacity of the civilian population has been severely weakened as a result of the war and the erosion of many traditional coping mechanisms including in particular the role of extended family networks.  According to a survey conducted by ICRC in 1999 a “remarkable 83 percent of Afghan respondents say that the war forced them to leave their homes.”  More than half of the respondents (53%) reported that a member of their immediate family was killed during the conflict and 16% reported knowing someone who was raped.   

The majority of the population struggles to survive at near subsistence levels. According to several food security surveys, around 50% of Kabul’s population (approx. 1.7 million) and other major urban centers are highly vulnerable.  In other words, they fall below the WFP-determined minimum income level required per person per month to meet minimum food and essential non-food needs.[4] The situation of females is such that practically all the households without an able-bodied male are vulnerable; they rely on food aid, children's work, and begging to survive. The cut-back in the limited possibilities that were available for women’s employment outside the home will further exacerbate this situation. 

The level of vulnerability in rural areas is also of major concern.  In some areas, for example in Hazarajat, the combination of war and drought has resulted in a significant increase in morbidity and mortality.  In other areas, deepening economic hardship has seen a growing number of farmers resort to poppy cultivation.[5]  Throughout Afghanistan, the impact of the war on the economic infrastructure has been devastating.    Transportation and communication facilities are derelict.  For Afghans, there are very few job opportunities outside the subsistence economy on the one hand and the criminalized economy on the other. 

Health and Nutrition 

Afghans suffer one of the worst health situations in the world.  All key indicators, including those for infant and maternal mortality, life expectancy and vaccination coverage, show that Afghanistan is in the bottom three countries of the world.   Health

services are minimal and are highly dependent on aid agency inputs.  One in four children die before the age of 5 and a staggering 85,000 die annually from diarrohea, an easily preventable disease.  Mothers in Afghanistan have the second highest mortality rate in the world with an estimated 16,000 maternal deaths annually.  UNICEF reports that in 1997, about one in six children (16%) showed evidence of acute malnutrition and about one half (48%) showed evidence of severe stunting.  A more recent study of the Kabul population commissioned by WFP reported a stunting rate of 53.7% with severe stunting of 27.3%.  WHO reports that some 300,000 Afghans are infected annually with malaria, but estimates that the actual numbers may be as high as 3 million.

2.         IMPACT OF SANCTIONS

Direct Impact 

UN Security Council sanctions imposed in November 1999 have had the greatest impact on Ariana Airlines.  Prior to sanctions, Ariana operated daily cargo flights serving Dubai and Amritsar, with a capacity of approximately 400 MT each way monthly.  The cargo from Afghanistan usually included fresh fruits while return cargo consisted of electronic goods, medicine and medical equipment. According to the staff of Indira Ghandi hospital in Kabul, 50% of medicine and medical equipment used in Kabul’s hospitals were shipped by Ariana.  The loss of the air route has meant that sales of fresh fruit are restricted to the low-price domestic market.  This has resulted in a loss of income and employment in harvesting, packing, and distribution tasks.  On the import side, the loss of the air link to India has brought to an end the import of medicines that were valued for their low cost and good quality.  By contrast, medicines from Pakistan and Iran are more expensive.

The inability of Ariana to operate internationally has forced the airline to suspend overtime payments to all personnel.  Ariana’s reduced income, and resulting loss in profitability, may be having an impact on the safety of its domestic operations. International Assistance Mission, an NGO working in Afghanistan, reported that their technical consultant to Ariana raised serious concerns regarding safety standards in the Ariana fleet. Particular concern was raised about Soviet-era turbo-props which are currently being used for domestic flights.  

The ban on Ariana has also disrupted the activities of the Afghan Postal Services.  This has contributed to the sense of isolation that Afghans feel.   In the week before the sanctions, Postal officials advise that they took in 10,000 letters a day from Afghans desperate to send letters to their relatives abroad.  

The lack of direct international air links to Afghanistan has restricted options for aid agencies operating in the country.  The health sector has been the most directly affected. The main supplier of eye care in Afghanistan, the International Assistance Mission’s Nur Eye Hopital previously purchased all its imported medicines in India and imported them via Ariana.  They have been unable to do this since the imposition of sanctions. In addition, recent moves to tighten up import controls in Pakistan mean that agencies are encountering delays and costs in clearing items through Peshawar.  

Thousands of Afghans demonstrated against the UN in all major Afghan cities immediately after the imposition of Security Council sanctions.  This resulted in the closure of some aid agency offices for several days. Some agencies, including the UN, evacuated their expatriate staff from specific regions.  Eventually, evacuated staff were able to return and resumed assistance activities after security assurances were received from the authorities. 

The humanitarian implications of the freezing of bank accounts related to IEA have been minimal.  Confidence in the public sector banks was lost long before the imposition of sanctions.  Remittances are normally transferred through the informal “hawala” system.

Indirect and Psychological Impact 

A significant impact of sanctions is the extent to which ordinary Afghans feel isolated and victimized.  There is a widespread perception that the United Nations has set out to harm rather than help Afghans.  There is a strong sense of bitterness and bewilderment in that Security Council action is perceived as targeting an innocent population and not the authorities with which it has a quarrel.  Discussions with Afghans in both IEA and ISA areas indicated a relatively low level of awareness of the nature and scope of the Security Council sanctions. They are known by the Farsi term “Tahreemat” or the Pashto term “Bandeezuna” and are commonly thought to be broad economic restrictions, rather than the specific measures that are in place.  Most people take it as self-evident that SC sanctions have disrupted trade, pushed up prices and caused suffering; this is due in part to statements by the authorities blaming sanctions for a wide range of ills including price hikes and the limited availability of social services.  

The situation is complicated by the reality of what is, in effect, an internal sanctions regime.  The Islamic Emirate has imposed restrictions on the movement of goods from areas under its control to areas controlled by the Islamic State. The list of sanctioned items include food staples, vegetable oils, medicines, fuel, lubricants and car parts.  Check posts in areas bordering Islamic State territory are charged with enforcing these sanctions and seize banned items found in searches.  It is noteworthy that an elaborate smuggling network has emerged and has resulted in a 100% increase in the price of some essential commodities. This is of particular concern at a time of food scarcity as a result of the drought. In ISA- controlled areas, it is clear that the humanitarian implications of these internal sanctions are considerable.  

Afghan Perspectives on Sanctions 

There is almost no support within Afghanistan for further economic sanctions. A broad range of respondents noted that they consider economic sanctions to be ineffective in relation to their stated objectives and are contrary to UN humanitarian and human rights objectives in the country. 

However, an overwhelming majority of respondents indicated that an arms embargo would command widespread support and moral authority.  While many respondents are aware of the practical difficulties inherent in imposing a meaningful arms embargo it is also increasingly apparent that a central challenge is to track and monitor arms flows.  As noted by many, UN restrictions on the transfer of weapons would avoid the humanitarian contradictions that are associated with economic measures. 

There is also a strong consensus within Afghanistan on the need for the United Nations to up-grade and intensify its political engagement and peace-making efforts.  Afghans from all walks of life repeatedly queried why more is not being done to achieve peace and bring the war to an end.

3.         CONCLUSIONS

 UN Security Council sanctions have had a tangible negative effect on the Afghan economy and on the ability of humanitarian agencies to render assistance to people in the country.  However, the impact of sanctions has been less significant than other shocks that have been imposed on the Afghan economy or the obstacles faced by aid agencies in the complex and volatile Afghan context. 

Humanitarian agencies operating in Afghanistan have been largely insulated from

frustrations over sanctions.  However, aid agencies are likely to face more serious

fallout, amounting to security threats, in the event of further economic sanctions.

There is no “public opinion” as such in Afghanistan, in that there are no representative institutions and no civil society mechanisms through which international coercion might be translated into public debate and domestic pressure for policy change.

The population of Afghanistan is already highly vulnerable.  It has limited ability to continue to withstand the accumulated as well as the direct effects of warfare, the drought, and a political and economic system that disallows the right of a significant proportion of the population to participate in action that is essential for its well-being.  Afghans have little capacity to cope with further economic shocks.   Any increase in prices of basic staples and medicine or any reduction in income and employment possibilities will have a significant impact on a population that is already operating on the margins of survival.