Introduction

The following preliminary observations should be borne in mind:

a.    Based on the experience in other theatres, the effectiveness of all arms embargo that is not mandatory is questionable. Furthermore, it might be desirable to establish a supervisory machinery in order to monitor the flow of goods into Afghanistan and to help the governments of the transit countries to discharge effectively their responsibilities arising from the embargo.

b.   The warring parties in Afghanistan have relatively few large weapons systems, and the war consumes only a limited amount of material, most of which can be carried by small trucks or pack animals. Given the length of the border of Afghanistan and the nature of the terrain, it would be quite impossible to prevent such shipments entirely.  The best that one could hope for would be to make the supply of  arms, to slow it down and make it more expensive. Over time, this might affect the behaviour and expectations of the Afghan parties and their suppliers.

Background

Situation

Assumptions

1. Any embargo should be effective and verifiable at least to some degree;
2. An embargo ought not to confer any advantage to any faction in the conflict;
3. For any embargo to be effective, it, should be verifiable and supported by all Member States, especially the neighbouring countries;
4. Costs will be a limiting factor that must be taken into consideration.

Embargo General

1. Selection of items to be embargoed;
2. Establishment of level of detection;
3. Selection of monitoring method;
4. Selection of supply routes to be monitored,
5. Selection of monitoring posts and areas of mobile patrolling,
6. Selection and assembly of monitoring teams;
7. Provision of infrastructure (logistic support, communications, etc.);
8. Monitoring of the selected routes;
9. Detection of the embargoed supplies;
10. Assembly of evidence;
11. Establishment of a supervisory organ and reporting mechanism for oversight and to deal with complaints or allegations of violations;
12. Enforcement of sanctions.

Geographical Considerations

A. The Pakistani Border

1. Principal roads
2. Secondary roads - itemized in Annex A-2
3. Minor trails
4. Tribal areas
5. 5. Air route
6. The terrain varies from mountainous to level desert like plains.

The tribal areas in southern and eastern Afghanistan possibly pose the greatest difficulties. In these areas, traditional migratory populations, show little recognition of the state boundaries.

Afghan factions are also supplied by air. Generally, longer range air supply requires major airfields, but this is NOT a guarantee as supplies could be dropped or minor airfields or roadways could be converted to receive longer range aircraft.

B.  The Iranian Border

C. The Turkmen Border

D. The Uzbek border

E. The Tajik Border

F. The Chinese Border

Supply Routes

a.  Major routes              6

b.  Major airfields            6

c.  Minor roads                40

d.  Minor airfields            7

e.   Tracks and trails        300

f.   Ports                          3

Total       362

Experts advise that some 40 minor routes and approximately 300 tracks and trails should be considered for planning purposes to cover the land borders of Afghanistan.

Logistic Considerations

Annex C indicates the requirements to transport this supply rate.

Larger rate require ships, large vehicles and large transport aircraft. As Afghanistan is land-locked, has relatively few large airports and a poor road network, it would be comparatively easy to detect large quantities of supply.

Scale of Detection

b.commercial suppliers and 

c."grey market" arms dealers.

Supplies are entering Afghanistan by:

c.barge.

It would also be possible to deliver smaller quantities by many minor overland and air routes. It is unlikely that these more difficult routes are being used to any great extent at present because other routes are open, but they could be used if the easier routes were denied by an effective embargo. For an embargo to be effective it would be necessary to monitor A, routes because of the low level of supply (estimated at 2 to 4,000 tons per month as already stated) that is required to go undetected to sustain the present and average level of hostilities. This level of supply could easily be reached by using minor routes and trails, some of which could have lain dormant for years and be brought back into operation rapidly as an embargo becomes more effective on the larger supply routes.

Conflict Characteristics

b. Tanks in use are rarely used conventionally, but more as a mobile gun or for morale or propaganda purposes

c. Similarly the use of air power is rarely used to effect. Likewise maintenance and high fuel usage are very problematic.

d.  Weapons mainly used for the fighting arc artillery such as rockets and shells, mortars, RTGs, anti-aircraft (in ground mode), and small arms.

e.  For mobility the preference is for 4 WD pickup trucks for troop movement rather than armoured personnel carriers, and small to medium size trucks/lorries for logistics.

Monitoring Overview

• Aerial
  • satellite imagery
  • manned aircraft
  • remote pilotless vehicles (R-PV) (drones)
• Ground
  • electronic manned posts and checkpoints
  • mobile patrolling,
• Intelligence
  • agents signals intelligence (sigint)
  • money trail - controls on financial transfers, freezing of assets, etc.

b. costs,

c. usefulness on stand alone basis,

and relating same to the Afghanistan scene, it follows that manned posts and checkpoints supported by mobile patrols must be employed.

Recommended Levels

Stationing UN Monitors in Afghanistan

As an alliterative, detection and prevention might occur at tile suspected points of departure. However, this would not guarantee that aircraft flights planned for one (seemingly innocent) destination would not be re-routed, stopped and unloaded elsewhere or en route.

Local Enforcement Agencies

The Options

A. Level of Detection Required

Level 1         to detect heavy weapons only

Level 2        to detect supply rates, of 50,000 tons per month

LeveL 3       to detect supply rates of 10,000 tons per month

Level 4        to detect supply rates of 3,000 tons per month

B.     Composition of Monitoring Teams:

2.International UN monitors

3.  Teams drawn from neighbouring states and supervised by UN

4.  UN team of experts "shadowing" local enforcement agencies

Self-monitoring

Advantages:

1. Puts onus on neighbouring and second tier countries,
2. Least expensive in manpower and infrastructure;
3. Wide ranging not limited to pre-selected posts.

1. No guarantee states will respond in an even and fair manner
2. Difficult to verify;
3. Even if supported at Governmental level, difficult to enforce everywhere;
4. Security of UN personnel may be problematic and costly to ensure.

Option 2 - UN International monitors at level I sites. This option envisages independent UN monitors at the major all-weather routes which are allegedly used to supply

Advantages:

1. Only nine sites to be staffed;
2. Legitimacy and credibility of independent monitors not influenced by local allegiances;
3. Staffing level of 30 per site = 2701;
4. Small infrastructure needed.

1. Detection of heavy weapons which are die least desired materials;
2. Supplies could be transferred to minor routes;
3. Security would be required to protect teams;
4. Little effect on factions' ability to fight.

Advantages:

1. Sixty-two sites to be manned;
2. Staffing level of 62 x 30 = 1,860 (still modest in relation to the task);
3. Forces suppliers to more difficult and costly routes;

1. Supplies detected not the most desired;
2. Could be switched to other routes;
3. Little effect on factions' ability to fight,

Option 4  - As 2 but to rate of 10.000 tons per month, i.e., auxiliary routes

Advantages:

1. Detection rate could affect the supply;
2. Forces suppliers to more difficult routes and conse­quently more costly.

1. Some 362 sites would need to be monitored;
2. Staffing level of 362 x 30 = 10,860;
3. Need for sophisticated command and control;
4. Large infrastructure.

Options5 - as 2 but to detection rate of3.01 month, i.e., supplementary routes.

Advantages:

1. Best possibility that embargo would "bite".

1. Much higher vigilance and more diligent searching needed;
2. Consequently more human resources or more specialists than Option 4;
3. Large infrastructure to including holding areas, search areas, loading and unloading bays, parking and detection capability,
4. Disruption to local legitimate trade.

Monitoring from Neighbouring Countries Supported by UN

Option 6—This  option envisages neighbouring states supplying members of the monitoring teams under the supervision of the UN to major routes

Advantages:

1. Involves neighbouring states;
2. Could build confidence;
3. Better chance of success of even-handed enforcement;
4. Capable of development;
5. Small UN international staff required.

1. Compatibility of members--Some members may not be acceptable to others;
2. Security;
3. Traffic could switch to other minor routes;
4. Only the heavier weapons detected, which are not the most needed;

0ption 7 - as 6 but to rate (150,000 tons per month)

Option 8—as of 10,000 tons per month,

Option 9 - as rate of 3,000 tons per month

Advantages:

1. As Option 6;
2. Detection rate Could affect conflict.

1. As Option 6;
2. Staffing level of 3,000 international staff.

UN team “Shadowing” Local Enforcement Agencies

Option 10—This option envisages international team 66 “shadowing" local enforcement agencies with extended brief to enforce arms embargo

Advantage:

1. Access to local knowledge;
2. Knowledgeable local staff in place;
3. Availability of State resources, i.e., aircraft, transport, infrastructure;
4. Economical in human resources;
5. Security supplied by local agencies;
6. Confidence building;
7. Verifiable;
8. Local arms manufacturers and suppliers known to local authorities-end user certification.;
9. Small number (100) international staff.

1. Local enforcement agencies not developed to equal standards in all neighbouring countries;
2. Depends on willingness of local authorities to assist.

Calculation of Staff in Levels

i.    Support from host countries

ii.   Level of detection required

iii.  Budget

iv. Other considerations such as involvement of local population to "win them over".

Staffing Level Calculation - International Staff
 
 

Staffing Level Calculation - International Staff Supported by Member States
 
 

Summary of Options

The monitoring options are summarized as follows:

Option/Remarks

1.     Unlikely to be fair and verifiable

UN International Monitors

2     (Blank in original document)

3      Little effect on conflict as sufficient arms could be delivered through alternative routes

4      (Blank)

5    Needs over 10,000 international staff

6    (Blank)

Monitors from Neighbouring Countries Supervised by UN

6      (Blank)

7      Little effect on conflict as sufficient arms could be delivered through alternative routes

8.     (Blank)

9      Needs 3,000 international staff

UN Teams "Shadowing" Local Enforcement Agencies

10     'Needs 100. international staff and support of local authorities

Security

Observations

However, in this case, the participating states would be required to dedicate significant additional resources for the purposes of the embargo.

The embargo would be more effective if it were also monitored inside Afghanistan. However, this would raise additional political and practical problems (e.g. security) which would need to be addressed at a later stage.

Conclusions

1. Arms are being supplied to the warring factions in Afghanistan by land, air and ferry port.
2. There an estimated 362 such points of entry.
3. Any such point of entry could accommodate the required supply rate of 3,000 tons of arms and ammunition per month to the conflict.
4. To be effective all these points of entry would have to be staffed 24 hours per day and a very high standard of search required to detect these small quantities.
5. There are no technological "miracle" systems available to replace "on-the-spot" manual monitoring.
6. An international staff of monitors of over 10,000 would be needed to monitor these routes, or an international staff of approximately 3,000 supported by neighbouring states.
7. Each of the neighbouring states, second tier countries and the Taliban and the Northern Alliance have their own On-Site Border Control Posts and Enforcement Agencies.
8. A relatively small staff (Central Coordination Headquarters d a cell in each sector totalling approximately 100) given the access to national agencies, border control, emigration, customs, drug enforcement authorities, etc. activities could give acceptable and verifiable monitoring results.
9. The UN has a satisfactory experience of one such embargo in Yugoslavia.

Annex A-1. Routes to be Monitored

(b) Ground Transport.

1. Major highways
2. Minor roads
3. Trails
    

Afghanistan has a number of major and secondary airfields that would require constant monitoring during embargo enforcement. Absent such enforcement efforts, routine cargo flights to these airfields could deliver some tens of thousand of metric tolls of goods annually.

Six Afghan airfields probably can handle long-range, heavy transports

such as the 11-76, capable of carrying up to 40 metric tons of cargo:
 

Airport	Runway length (metres)
Bagram Airbase	3,000
Herat	2,600
Kabul International	3,500
Qandahar	3,200
Shindand Airbase	2,700
Mazar-e Sharif	3,100

 

Total six major airfields

Another seven smaller airfields can handle at least short-range, light ­to-medium, transport aircraft-such as the An-26, An-32, and C-130­ which can carry up to 20, metric tons of cargo:
 

Airport	Runway length (metres)
Bamian	1,500
Fayzabad	1,800
JaIalabad	1,800
Konduz	2,000
Meymanah	2,000
Sheberghan	2,600
Taloqan	2,000

 

Total seven minor airfields

Annex A-2. Ground Transportation with Neighbouring States

Major Routes. Afghanistan's major highway link; to the front-line states are sufficiently developed to handle up to 85,000 metric tons of cargo per day, although actual usage typically is considerably less.  These major routes include:

Route	Capacity (mt/day)	No. of Lanes
Mazar-i-Sharif-Termiz, Uzbekistan (port)	11,000	2
JaIalabad-Peshawar, Pakistan	21,000	2
Qandahar-Quetta, Pakistan	11,000	2
Herat-Kushka, Turkmenistan	17,000	2
Herat-Tayyebat, Iran	21,000	2
Delaran-Zabol, Iran	5,000	1

 

Total six major land routes

Minor Routes. Any attempt to circumvent an embargo would be likely to place special emphasis on supply routes that avoid major highways in favour of more remote trails and mountain passes. During the 1980s anti-Soviet jihad, Afghan insurgents were primarily resupplied by such routes, and factions would likely seek to re-establish them to counteract any embargo.

Total forty minor routes. Tracks and Trails. Mountain passes - many part of old caravan trade routes that are located along the Afghan - Pakistan border from the Wakhan corridor in the north to Qandahar Province in the south can be used to move goods into Afghanistan. At least six of these passes call accommodate motor vehicle traffic, while another 56 can handle pack animals during at least summer and early fall. Most of the northern and central passes are open only during summer and early fill, although the more southerly passes arc typically open year round.

An undetermined number of trails - most of which likely call accom­modate cargo trucks- also cross into Afghanistan through the mid flatland along the country's southern and western borders. These remote regions are likely to require constant monitoring to enforce all embargo.

Cargo Caravans.Caravans following ancient trails through remote regions have been one of the primary means for moving cargo into and within Afghanistan, and would be likely to be used during attempts to circumvent an embargo. These caravans typically consist of pack animals-including camels, horses, donkeys, and mules-have been the traditional means of transportation in Afghanistan for centuries, especially to cross rugged mountain terrain. Although each pack animal typically carries only several hundred kilograms of goods, organized caravans likely could deliver some 10- 15,000 metric tons of cargo yearly.

Cargo trucks frequently are used when conditions allow, such as crossing flat-to-rolling desert terrain. Depending on the specific vehicles involved, each cargo truck would be likely to be capable of delivering some 2.5 to 5 metric tons of goods per trio, and organized truck convoys through remote regions would be likely to be used to deliver 20,000 ­--30,000 metric tons of cargo annually.

Total 300 trails

Annex A-3. Amu Darya (River) Ports

Sher Khan. Located about 60 kms north of Konduz, opposite Tajikistan, the port, handles commercial goods and fuel shipments.  Facilities include a 180 metre quay for vessel berthing at about 200 metres of riverbank. Maximum cargo transferable through the port is estimated at 1,000 mt/day.

  Keleft. The smallest of the three port facilities, Keleft is located some100 kms west of Jeyretan, opposite Turkmenistan.  The port has a total of only some 175 metres of riverbank being space, and maximum cargo transferable through the port  is estimated at only 320 mt/day.

Total three ports: