In order to understand the roots of the U.S. lead U.N. sanctions in Afghanistan, it helps to understand who Osama bin Laden, the man accused by the U.S. of masterminding the bombing of two U.S. embassies in Africa, is and how he ended up in Afghanistan as the so called "guest" of the Taliban.

1.1 Osama and the Afghan Jihad

In the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December of 1979, hundreds of young Arabs joined hands with the Afghan Mujahideen to carry out a Jihad (Holy war) against Soviet invaders and their puppet regime in Kabul. Among the young Arabs was Osama bin Laden, the son of a wealthy Saudi family, who had abandoned his billion dollar family business to come and join hands with the Afghan resistance [for a more detailed look into the activities of bin Laden please refer to Exposing Pakistan's Deceitful Game, by Members of Institute for Afghan Studies, August 1999].

Through most of the 1980s, Osama bankrolled factions of Afghan Mujahideen guerrillas. He supported them with weapons and his own construction equipment. Throughout the 80's and the 90's he has also forged a special relationship with Pakistan's elite and specially with the ISI. A US based newspaper, Pakistan Today, reported in its July 23, 1999 issue, that Osama had contributed one billion Pakistani Rupees in support of Nawaz Sharif in the 1997 elections.

1.2 Osama turns on Saudi regime

Bin Laden, who had been careful throughout the 80's to distance himself from U.S. influence, became a leader of the Afghan Arabs and to some a regional hero.  The Gulf War, however, cemented in him a hatred for the U.S. government and radicalized bin Laden's politics. Bin Laden, who had been back in Saudi Arabia in 1990, took a violent exception to Desert Storm and the U.S. military buildup in his country. He declared the Saudi ruling family "insufficiently Islamic" and increasingly advocated the use of violence to force his movement towards extremism. The Saudi government ejected bin Laden, charging him with inciting fundamentalist opposition to the country's royal family. He went into exile in Sudan. He was expelled from Sudan five years later under the U.S., Egyptian and Saudi pressure. In 1996, during the regime of Prof. Rabbani, he took refuge in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

His organization of Al-Qaeda (meaning military base) is a loosely bound group, which includes his Arab followers and former freedom fighters who fought in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda operatives or sympathizers are accused of attacking American soldiers in Somalia, Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden currently lives, in hiding, somewhere in the mountainous region of Eastern Afghanistan.

1.3 US attempts to nab him

The U.S. government has accused Osama of masterminding the August '98 U.S. embassy bombings in Africa and has made a number of attempts to bring him to the U.S. to face trial. On August 20, 1998, the U.S. Navy launched between 70-80 cruise missiles on Afghanistan, targeting Osama bin Laden and his associates during what was thought to be a major gathering of bin Laden and his associates near Khost in Paktia Province of Afghanistan. Since then the U.S. government has asked repeatedly the Taliban regime to hand over Osama. There have even been reports in Pakistani media of commando units as well as hired ex-Mujahideen groups trying to nab Osama. All these attempts have so far failed to result in the capture of bin Laden.

On July 6, 1999 the U.S. government imposed a number of unilateral economic sanctions on the Taliban regime, including the freezing of Taliban assets in the U.S. and blocking of economic transactions between U.S. subjects and the Taliban regime.

On October 15, 1999 the United Nations Security Council at the urging of the U.S. approved a sanctions resolution against the government of the Taliban demanding the hand over of Osama bin Laden. The Council gave the Taliban until November 14, 1999 to comply with the demands of the resolution.  With the passing of the due date and with the non-compliance of the Taliban, the sanctions have now gone into full effect.
 

2. Economic and Humanitarian Impact of the Sanctions

In this section, we will discuss the scope, as well as the short and the long term impacts of the UN imposed sanctions on the Taliban and on ordinary Afghans.

2.1 Scope of the Economic Sanctions

The UN sanctions imposed on the Taliban have two main provisions. First, they require that all states ban arrivals or departures by aircrafts owned, leased or operated by or on behalf of the Taliban. The only exceptions are flights intended for delivering humanitarian assistance and performing religious obligations. Second, all countries must freeze funds and other financial resources owned or controlled by the Taliban, directly or indirectly, except for any that the sanctions committee made up of all members of Security Council exempts on humanitarian grounds.

On its face, the sanctions seem to target Taliban alone, but its implications, as discussed below, are broader with negative consequences for ordinary Afghans.

2.2 Short Term Impact of the Sanctions on the Taliban and on the Ordinary Afghans

The sanctions will undoubtedly squeeze the Taliban economically. The ban on the Ariana Afghan Airlines flights, which was operating five flights a week to the UAE, will cut off a source of foreign exchange for the Taliban. The Taliban contend though that they were not receiving Ariana's income and that Ariana is a non-profit airline and its fleet of aircraft including three 727 Boeings, barely meet their operational expenses on international routes.

In any case, the last Ariana flight from the UAE was carrying 12 passengers and about 15 tones of cargo to Kandahar. Its planes would probably be grounded now that they won't be able to fly overseas and would be unable to procure spares for maintenance purposes. However, if the Taliban manage to transport spare parts for the plane through Pakistan, the Ariana Afghan Airlines would probably continue to operate internally. Nevertheless, Ariana would experience a shortfall in revenues due to a lack of expensive cargo and lower domestic ticket prices.

Even though the impact of the sanctions on Ariana is probably significant, reduction in revenues from the five flights a week of Ariana to the UAE does not seem to have a substantial economic impact on the Taliban as a whole. It is even less likely that the ban would accomplish its goal of forcing the Taliban to hand over Bin Laden.

Although the ban on Ariana is unlikely to hurt the Taliban substantially, Afghanistan's people are expected to suffer, according to a Reuters's reporter, Sayed Salahuddin, Reuters november 14, 1999. Ariana usually transported food, medicine and electronic goods from the UAE to Afghanistan. According to doctors of Indira Ghandi hospital in Kabul, 50% of medicine and medical equipment used in Kabul's hospitals were shipped by Ariana. The exemption of humanitarian assistance would allow the import of medicine, but the requirement that humanitarian goods should first be approved by the Sanction Committee of the Security Council and the costs of chartering special planes to transport the goods to Afghanistan would make them exorbitantly costly.

In addition, some of the more than 1,500 employees of Ariana, probably the most successful company in Afghanistan, would be laid off because of loss of revenues from international flights. Afghan travelers will also no longer be able to go directly to Afghanistan, but must fly to Pakistan and then travel through the treacherous and dangerous roads to Afghanistan.

The other major victim of the ban on Ariana is the Afghan Postal Services that depended on Ariana for transporting mail. Recently, the Taliban had revived the Afghan Mail Service, which allowed Afghans inside and outside the country to communicate with their family members. During the last week before the sanctions, Postal officials took in 10,000 letters a day from Afghans desperate to send their last letters abroad. That link will be cut and at least some of the 1,700 or so Afghan mail carriers will probably lose their jobs as well, if they can not find another means of transporting the mail. The only other option is to go to Pakistan to send letters which is unaffordably expensive and time consuming.

Afghans are set to suffer from some of the unintended consequences of the sanctions as well. Sanctions have caused thousands of Afghans to demonstrate in all major cities of Afghanistan against the UN and NGOs, forcing some NGOs to evacuate their foreign staff. So far more than a dozen foreigners, all associated with different NGOs, were learnt to have crossed over into Pakistan. If the trend continues, poor Afghans would be hurt the most because currently the Western NGOs provide them with the basic humanitarian aid, such as food and clothes.

The implications of freezing Taliban's assets abroad is unlikely to bother the Taliban for the simple reason that Taliban do not seem to have assets abroad. The U.S. has already frozen $500,000 that Ariana Airlines had in the U.S. banks after imposing a unilateral economic sanctions on the Taliban in August of this year. Currently, even if the Taliban had any such deposits in the foreign banks, those assets are most probably shifted to personal accounts of traders and others who support the Taliban because of the one month delay in the sanction.

Finally, Pakistan's reactions to the sanctions will be the most crucial factor about the short term financial impact of the sanctions. The text of the Security Council resolution imposing sanctions does not mention blockade of Afghanistan's land routes. So on its face, it seems that business between Pakistan and the Taliban held areas will continue normally. If that is the case though, Pakistan will probably find itself under increasing international pressure for violating at least the spirit of the sanctions on Taliban. It is most likely that Pakistan like other countries would not be able to extend its economic ties with the Taliban, but would not fetter with trade between the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, if Pakistan attempts to close land trade routes to Afghanistan, which seems unlikely, the Taliban would suffer tremendous economic losses.

2.3 Long Term Implication of the Sanctions on Afghanistan

The sanctions will have long term negative effects on rebuilding Afghanistan and on reviving its ruined economic infrastructure. Foreign investment is undoubtedly vital for reviving the country's economy. The sanctions clearly ban any investment in Afghanistan. Afghanistan's economy will then remain in ruins for a long period or at least until the sanctions are lifted. A good example of how important foreign investment could be to rebuild Afghanistan is the investment by a private American phone company in Afghanistan. The phone system was about to resume its operation in Afghanistan in August this year, but soon after the US unilaterally imposed sanctions on the Taliban, the project came to a halt, thus, leaving Afghans without an effective means of establishing ties with outside world. Not to mention that millions of Afghans abroad would have been able to hear their loved ones in Afghanistan. Despite the fact that the UN Security Council has said the sanctions were not intended against the Afghan people, it is evident that, without free trade with outside world, foreign investment and the resurrection of the economy, the Afghan people's sufferings will continue. Chronic problems, such as, unemployment, poverty, hunger and diseases will continue to destroy the fabric of the Afghan society.

Also, one of the unintended long term implications of the sanctions is that the Taliban will seek other means to compensate for their financial losses. One such means at the Taliban's disposal is the production of drugs. They will probably encourage the cultivation of poppy to make up for the shortfall in their budget. Thus, it will be a blow to efforts geared towards curbing drug production in Afghanistan.

In sum, while the ban on international flights would reduce the income of Ariana and in doing so of the Taliban, it would have far more drastic implications on ordinary Afghans, specially on those who needed the services of Ariana for transporting essential goods or were its travelers. Most of the employees of the Airline and the Postal service would also lose their jobs. Further, poor Afghans would suffer the most if the Western NGOs continue to evacuate their staff due to the increased security threats. The question of freezing Taliban's assets abroad may not even arise because of apparent non-existence of such assets. Finally, in the long run Afghanistan would not be able to rebuild its ruined economy and infrastructure because of the sanction's ban on foreign investment.
  

3. Political Impact of the Sanctions

To assess the political impact of the sanctions, it is important to keep in mind the nature of the Taliban regime, their form of government, their constituency and their relationship with the international community.

The Taliban are by and large a military machine, whose sole focus and drive remains to be the capture of all Afghan territory. Their stated intention has been to bring an end to the warlordism which was rampant in Afghanistan, after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces and specially so after the removal of Najib's government and the takeover of the Mujahideen government in April of 1992.

To run this military machine, the Taliban are dependent on military aid, which they reportedly receive from Pakistan and Arab benefactors (including Osama bin Laden), and loyal fighters, which they recruit from religious schools in Afghanistan and across the border in Pakistan.

Today the Taliban are perhaps the most isolated regime internationally, mainly due to their strict policies at home which has specially taken a heavy toll on the citizens of larger cities, particularly of Kabul. As young madrassa (seminary) students, who have spent their formative years fighting the Soviets, they have shown to lack the sophistication and the ability to handle the monumental challenges that lie before them in the wake of the complete destruction of the country during and after the Soviet invasion.  Ironically their international isolation has further deepened their dependence on their current benefactors.

3.1 Political Objectives

The political effects of sanctions cannot be measured without considering the intended political objectives of the sanctions, which in this case is limited to the hand over of Osama to the U.S. or to a third country, from where he can be either tried for his alleged crimes or subsequently extradited to the U.S. The assessment of sanctions must therefore examine to what extent this objective can be attained and how long must the sanctions remain in place for achieving the stated objective of the sanctions. This needs to be re-examined should the sanctions remain in place for sometime.

3.2 Enforcement Regime

Because of the already isolated nature of the Taliban, the enforcement regime depends mainly on the actions of the three nations which recognize the Taliban and which have some level of economic ties with the Taliban regime.

The Saudis and the United Arab Emirate have stated that they will enforce the sanctions. However it is not clear how their traders who are directly involved in exporting goods to Afghanistan will react to these sanctions. It remains to be seen how they will try to use their influence on their respective governments to get around the sanctions.

The Pakistani government has so far remained rather quiet on the question of sanctions and its enforcement. The new regime in Islamabad has issued a statement expressing its reservation on imposing sanctions, stating that the sanctions are not the proper way to resolve this issue.

Indeed the new regime of Gen. Musharaf is facing its first international challenge. On the one hand Pakistan is set to lose credibility with the West and the UN if it openly disregards the Security Council resolution, something which the new regime in Islamabad can ill afford. The month old military regime is already on shaky economic, legal, and political grounds and needs Western support.  Foremost, the new government in Islamabad needs to get the crucial IMF loans to revive its almost bankrupt economy and needs political support for continuing its rule.

On the other hand, Taliban are currently Pakistan's closest ally in Afghanistan.  Pakistan has invested politically, economically and militarily in assisting the Taliban take control of much of Afghanistan.  If Pakistan's relations are strained with the Taliban, they are set to lose their influence in Afghanistan and in the region.  Further, the Pakistani government is restricted from following the US policy because of fear of an Islamic backlash against it.  The people of Pakistan in general and Pakistan's Islamic parties in particular do not see Bin Laden as the terrorist that the US has portrayed him to be.  In addition, Pakistani Pashtoons also resist implementation of the sanctions.  The key to whether Pakistan would strictly enforce the sanctions lies, however, on the Pakistani army and the incentives provided to it by the US.

3.3 Taliban Reaction

There is a genuine view within the Taliban that the Big Powers do not accept them because of who they are, not because of what they have done.  Thus they view the sanctions as another tool to isolate and weaken them.  They argue that the UN and the US have not recognized their government despite the fact that they have brought order to 80-90% of the country, but continue to recognize a government which exists only in name and is made up of a loose coalition notorious for their infighting and lack of discipline. The Taliban will most likely accuse the U.N. and specially the U.S., as they have in the past few days, of having secret agendas in trying to influence internal Afghan politics for reasons of self interest.

The Taliban no doubt will try to manipulate the sanctions to serve their own objectives. They will most likely use the sanctions as a powerful propaganda tool, by insisting that sanctions are meant to punish the Afghan people.  They will personalize the sanctions and will appeal to Afghan national pride.

This is actually a common reaction by other governments who in the past have found themselves the target of sanctions. The so called rally around the flag effect will no doubt manifest itself in Afghanistan as well, as the authorities will encourage the development of a siege mentality against the sanctions.

Perhaps more importantly the Taliban will use the sanctions as a scapegoat for the many problems that their administration is facing today. The sanctions will provide a useful cover for the regime's inadequacies in addressing critical problems that faces the population.

3.4 Strengthening the Hard-liners

Sanctions have in the past tended to fuel and encourage extremism on both sides of a conflict. In case of the Taliban, at least initially, it will most certainly give the hard-liners within their movement an upper hand. Although talking about hard-liners among the Taliban may be an oxymoron, nevertheless it is widely believed that there are a number of factions within the Taliban movement with varying degrees of militancy.  It is believed that any further isolation of their movement may weaken even more those elements among them who are opting for a more flexible approach to issues and policies.

3.5 Opposition Reaction

Although the opposition alliance has welcomed the sanctions, the political impact on their group is less certain. They will certainly try to capitalize on the sanctions both internally and internationally. It is hard, however, to judge the effectiveness of their attempts, given the fact that Osama bin Laden got involved in Afghan Jihad in the early 80's and that it was their regime that invited Osama to take residence in Jalalabad in May of 1996 after he was expelled from Sudan.

As far as the ongoing military conflict between the opposition and the Taliban is concerned, it is thought the sanctions, in its present form, will certainly not reduce the conflict and may not actually have much of an effect.
 

4. Resolving the Stalemate

It has been more than a year since the U.S. and the Taliban have tried unsuccessfuly to resolve the bin Laden issue. Now with the enforcing of the U.N. sanctions, the parties are entering a new phase, which may lead to more hardships for the innocent people of Afghanistan, who themselves have been and continue to be victims of the various warring factions.  To alleviate further hardship on the innocent citizens of Afghanistan, the parties must find other ways to resolve this issue. In the next few paragraphs we will briefly point to a number of mechanisms, which may have a better chance of finding a solution to the current stalemate.

First, since bilateral talks between the US and the Taliban have failed so far, a third country or international organization should be chosen to mediate between them.  Either countries such as Saudi Arabia or Pakistan and international organizations such as the UN or OIC seem to be suitable to act as a mediator because they can be trusted by both the US and the Taliban.   Second, the international criminal law requires presenting of credible evidence before an individual can be removed for trial in to another country.  So the US must provide credible evidence to the Taliban or an intermediary party, which has not been done so far, that links Osama to the embassy bombings in Africa.  Third, Taliban must recognize their responsibility for the security and welfare of all Afghans in their territory and for the integrity and sovereignty of Afghanistan.  As such, they should not jeopardize the lives of millions who have sacrificed dearly for Afghanistan, and ask Bin Laden to leave Afghanistan, if the evidence shows that he supported or sponsored the African bombings.

Another potential solution out of this quagmire is for the Taliban to hand over bin Laden to an international court which provides him a fair hearing. Precedence for such a mechanism can be found in the case of the two Libyan nationals accused of having a hand in the PanAm flight tragedy.  This mechanism will assure the U.S. that a criminal act will not go unaccounted for and at the same time will allow the Taliban to declare that they have not compromised their principles.  This will also provide the Taliban with an opportunity to rid themselves of an international problem which they certainly can ill afford without compromising their relationship with their constituents.

Either by asking bin Laden to leave Afghanistan or by handing him over to an international or an OIC sponsored judicial system, the Taliban have to start prioritizing their responsibilities, which is first and foremost to the war ravaged people of Afghanistan. As the dominant warring faction in Afghanistan, it is their duty and responsibility to take any and all steps to remove Afghanistan out of its current international isolation and move it along a path of reconstruction and peace building process.
 

5. Conclusions

Bin Laden may not leave Afghanistan peacefully if the UN, particularly the US, and the Taliban continue their rigid stands.  Although the economic sanctions would further isolate the Taliban politically and economically, they have shown so far that they can survive despite international isolation.  However, the sanctions would likely hurt the people of Afghanistan, who have already suffered tremendously through more than 10 years of Soviet invasion and 10 years of foreign fueled civil war. To spare Afghans from greater hardships, the US and Taliban should take serious and concrete steps to resolve their differences regarding Bin Laden.