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By: Akmal Dawi Stabilization, Democratization and Post-conflict Development Post 9/11 US state building project in Afghanistan: Introduction: “We begin the story by invoking a first-person narrative point of view, and telling what happened on September 11th 2001.” 1 Unexpected and unpredicted “events” have changed the fates of millions of people throughout human history. On 28 June 1914 the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, ignited the flames of 1st World War; on 7 December 1941 Japanese air raid on Pearl Harbor engaged a bystander superpower in World War II; and on 11 September 2001 two planes crushed the World Trade Centre in New York, and since the War on Terror has started. Today everyone in our diverse world recognizes Taliban as the medieval fanatics that ruthlessly brutalized millions of Afghans under their rule – they deprived females of all their rights; penalized beard-cutting; banned music, cinema and other entertainment; and in short widely terrorized innocent civilians. A sinister question always provokes my sympathetic feelings for the victims of 9/11. ‘If 9/11 had not happened, would Taliban have been toppled?’ American scholar, Martha Brill Olcotthas, has a negative answer to this question: “Had US airline security personnel been more vigilant at Dulles, Newark and Logan airports, or had Mohammed Atta not been such a good student of civil engineering as to figure out how to bring down the twin towers of the World Trade Centre, the US might never have turned its attention to Afghanistan.2” Imprisoned by its parochial ‘power-politics’ and unlimited ‘self-interests’ our only superpower (the US) ignored the vicious ruling of Alqaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan. 9/11 reminds us the fact that the US has not gone to Afghanistan for a humanitarian mission: to free the oppressed Afghan people from brutal rulers and end their miseries. The US brought down Taliban in a retaliatory operation designed to punish those who attacked New York and Washington. Although President George W. Bush and his neo-conservative circles perpetually refer to Afghanistan as a ‘success story’ in order to justify his aggressive international-expansionism, nevertheless in this essay I want to argue that Afghanistan will remain a weak state with fragile institutions. The grandiose concept of ‘state-building’ in Afghanistan through another popular “Marshall Plan”, in my understanding, is a rejected reality which is camouflaged by tactical US humanitarian diplomacy. In this essay the post 9/11 US foreign policy in Afghanistan is analyzed and in many ways critiqued. In the beginning of the essay the history of US – Afghanistan is unpacked followed by US involvement in Soviet – Afghan proxy war which took place between 1979 and 1989. There are balanced critiques and defences of US foreign policy in the aftermath of Cold War which constitutes the body of this essay. Eventual analyses are concentrated on 9/11 and state building efforts that have shaped US new policy approach to post Taliban Afghanistan. Afghanistan-US relations: “In 1943, Abdul Hossain Aziz Mohammadzai….[arrived] in Washington, D.C. to formally establish bilateral relations with the United States, the newly appointed Ambassador purchased its current residence at a cost of $50,000 from the outgoing Chief Justice of the US Supreme Court.”3 A SHORT VISIT OF PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER IN 1953 FROM Kabul and some modest developmental projects shaped Afghanistan-US relations from 1943 up until 1979. From an American perspective, as Tom Lansford mentions, Afghanistan lacked the strategic location and vital resources that could include the country in the core band of US foreign policy interests in the region4. Nevertheless according to the State Department’s documents “From 1950 to 1979, US foreign assistance provided Afghanistan with more than US$500 million in loans, grants, and surplus agricultural commodities to develop transportation facilities, increase agricultural production, and expand the educational system … in the 1950s, the US declined Afghanistan's request for defense cooperation”5. From the inception of their bilateral diplomatic relations Afghan politicians considered US as a great ‘new’ player in world politics that had widely demonstrated its modern-power in both World Wars. For Afghan rulers the US had a rather positive identity in Asian politics; the US was not an old colonial force, and did not have, from an Afghan perspective at least, any territorial ambitions in Afghanistan. Nonetheless due to series of geo-strategic analyses and strong realistic considerations that shapes US foreign policy in South-Asia region, Afghan leaders failed to attract wider US support. It was the 1979 Soviet invasion that brought Afghanistan to the erstwhile President’s (Jimmy Carter) table demanding a decisive and urgent reaction on his part. The invasion gave Washington the golden opportunity to launch a proxy war in its rival’s backyard, and by so doing tried to repay the old scores of Vietnam debacle. One US administrator is quoted to have said “our aim is to make the Soviets bleed with their own Vietnam”.6 Zbigniew Kazimierz Brzezinski, the mighty National Security Advisor to President Carter, was a key member of President Carter’s administration whose deterministic approach opened a new chapter in Cold War history, and drag the Red army into a Vietnam-like tragedy. At the dawn of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the Brzezinski was posing to photographs in a Pathan turban on the Khyber Pass and shouting “Allah is on your side”.7 A country that had not recovered from the old wounds of 19th and early 20th centuries’ “Great Game” of two colonial forces, namely Tsarist Russia and British India, unwittingly got trapped in the power-politics of post World War imperial superpowers: the USSR & USA respectively. When President Ronald Reagan came into power in 1980 the US broadened its anti-Soviet operations in Afghanistan. Based on various documents the US assisted Afghan resistance fighters with over US$5 billion worth of light and heavy weaponries and other requirements to fight the Soviet satellite secular regime in Afghanistan.8 It was during this span of time that the US used every possible means to give Soviets a hard time in Afghanistan. The CIA selected extremist Islamists as strategic partners and supplied them with immense material as well as political support. One observer wrote “both the Soviet Union and the United States dispensed their armaments among Afghans, as a humanitarian organization would distribute food aid during famine.”9 There are critics who suggest that current terrorist networks have their primary roots in notorious CIA projects which were carelessly designed in the course of Afghan – Soviet war in 1980s. President George W. Bush’s No.1 enemy, Osama Bin laden, is believed to have received US aid in various forms during the Soviet vs. Afghan war which provided him the means to lay the foundational structure of Alqaeda’s transnational Islamic network. According to Amalendu Misra, an academic observer of Afghanistan affairs “the three ideologically inspired radical resistance movements operating from Afghanistan – namely, the Mujahideen, the Taliban and Alqaeda – owe their very origins to Western organizational and economic support”10. When asked whether tremendous Afghan disasters were consequences of improper US foreign policy one of the architects of the Soviet vs. Afghan proxy war, Zbigniew Brzezinski even refused a simple regret! “Regret what? The secret operation was an excellent idea. It has the effect of drawing the Russian into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? The day that the Soviets officially crossed the border I wrote to the President Carter: We now have the opportunity of giving the USSR its own Vietnam War….what is more important to the history of the world? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? A few crazed Muslims or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?”11 To conclude this piece, it is interesting to note that throughout the 1980s and early 1990s the official US foreign policy (as the preacher of democracy and freedom) was to oppose Afghanistan’s socialist-secular government and support Pakistan-based extremist-fanatics. Mission accomplished THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN IN 1989 LEFT mixed implications. Many observers believed the withdrawal justified the victory of Afghans over Soviet invaders, for others it created a strong economic and political vacuum. The withdrawal exacerbated the collapse of Soviet empire in 1991 which ended the Cold War era. The New World euphoria ignored the harsh realities of Afghanistan which after over 13 years of fratricidal war was supposed to embrace a purely Islamic state. Majority of Afghans believe the end of the Cold War hijacked anti-Soviet sacrifices from widely devastated Afghanistan into Eastern Europe and the unification of Germany. It is indeed very interesting to note the abrupt termination of US diverse support to Afghan Mujahideen in 1991 – the fragmented and heavily equipped groups along with their extreme ideological psychology of hatred that once could not breathe without US assistance were left alone to govern a shattered country independently. Since last four years many US commentators have perpetually raised the ignorance of Afghanistan in 1990s as key element of 9/11 incidents. Some US officials have also accepted foreign policy failures to realize post Cold War realities in Afghanistan; Washington envoys have repeatedly reiterated such mistakes will not take place for a second time.12 The admittance of ‘policy flaws’ by US mandarins can hardly illustrate the consequences of State Department’s irresponsible position towards fundamental changes in Afghanistan.* Though Afghans unanimously blame US for its failure to support post-conflict developments in their country, nevertheless it seems post-Cold War structures mainly the unexpected disintegration of Soviet Union engaged Washington with unprecedented global strategic implications. From Europe to Asia and Africa dozens of formerly Soviet states emerged as independent polities in a short period each of which demanded Washington’s leadership in their transition to stability and consolidation. As a matter of fact the US was not fully prepared to meet all these changes, meanwhile Washington lacked the capacity to effectively organize an international transitional period through which all post Soviet states could gradually adjust their system according to neo-liberal democratic principles. Therefore it might to be unfair to unilaterally hold US as the only responsible of all post Cold War anarchic events in Afghanistan and other parts of the world. Afghans (particularly their new Islamist leaders) can be, to certain extent, blamed for their wrong-doings and mismanagements.* Meanwhile the constant interference of neighboring states that maintained strong ties with Jehadi leaders can be regarded as another fundamental cause for civil disorder in Afghanistan. This ‘realistic’ reasoning for the initial US disappearance from Afghanistan (1991 to 1993) can easily be challenged by the continuation of futile war and other brutal changes that continued to happen in Afghanistan which were perpetually ignored or regarded as ‘Afghan internal problems’ by US administrations. It seems that the US being the sole superpower of the time had undeniable ethical and legal (according to the principles of “International Responsibility to Protect”) responsibilities to exempt the people of Afghanistan from their brutal totalitarianism and undemocratic leaders throughout 1990s. Mujahideen, the Taliban and a war-ravaged nation President George H. Bush’s administration is repeatedly criticized by US think-tanks, academia and other political commentators for its failure to develop an effective and sustainable exit strategy from Afghanistan. On the other there are also some internationalist figures with the administration that accuse former President Bill Clinton for his failure to address the consolidation of Taliban and Alqaeda regime in Afghanistan; in their perspective, if President Clinton had stopped the consolidation of Taliban and Bin Laden in mid 1990s, the attacks on the US soil would not have happened at all. There are also strong critics from the Afghan side who blame US for being as bystander hegemony throughout fractional wars in 1990s. 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 NEW ERA OF ‘STATE-BUILDING’ “We will help the Afghan people build strong, lasting government and civic institutions. We'll continue to support reconstruction, economic development and investments that will help educate and build the skills of the Afghan people.”13 President George W. Bush ‘AFGHANISTAN, TALIBAN, BIN LADEN AND 9/11’ – THE INDIVISIBLE CLAUSE that constitutes the first prominent lines of 21st century’s history. If you were the President of US what would have you done with a geo-strategically insignificant country with no oil resources, no infrastructure and weak professional human-resources – a country given to fanatical warlords at the end of the Cold War that eventually harbored transnational terrorists’ networks and fiercely attacked US land? Not a single state opposed President Bush’s decision to topple the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Regime deconstruction has an old international tradition of state reconstruction; this default formula became irrefutable reality in December 2001 when the US was, unwittingly, dragged into the ‘state building’ process in Afghanistan when Taliban and their terrorist supporters were brought down by anti-terrorist coalition forces. Since its emergence as a superpower in global politics at the end of WW II – US foreign-policy-makers have experienced and implemented series of state-building projects under variety of titles such as; nation building, post-conflict reconstruction, democratization and many other diplomatic entities. The ultimate targets of all “building” mechanisms are, according to American literature, the installation of pro-US states, as Michael McFaul puts it “The process of defeating the enemies of liberty is twofold: Crush their regimes or the regimes that harbor them and then build new democratic, pro-Western in the vacuum.”14 Post 2nd World War Japan and Germany are two brilliant paradigms of US successful nation-building projects which are constantly envied by other post-conflict countries, yet Vietnam on the other side of the coin demonstrates not only US failure to build a viable capitalist state, but also the unforgivable mistakes of US policy makers that culminated in tremendous human and material losses in Vietnam. Unsurprisingly in October 2001 US forces and the CIA covert-operations brought down the Taliban tyranny in a matter of days. Although anti-Taliban operations did not bring Bin laden, the mastermind of 9/11 attacks, to justice. Nonetheless it formally signified US victory in the asymmetric war against a tyrant regime in Afghanistan. Yet the second-fold of the job ‘state reconstruction’ or filling the Taliban vacuum, appeared an inevitable responsibility which continuously demands comprehensive and ever more extensive US involvement in post-Taliban Afghanistan. According to a New York based expert of Afghanistan, from the onset the US administration was reluctant to involve itself in what is referred to by most US officials as the ‘Quagmire’ job of nation-building.15 However it was almost impossible for Washington to repeat the old mistakes of 1990s and allow the anarchic forces of Northern Alliance (anti-Taliban forces) to reestablish their rule on Afghanistan. No doubt the harmonized stance of the international community which demonstrated the will to take part in post-conflict reconstruction also prolonged US involvement in post-Taliban Afghanistan. With another mission virtually completed in Afghanistan the erstwhile National Security Advisor claimed that the ‘Political Game Plan*’ had to be implemented. Nonetheless due to exceptional circumstances (Bin laden, Omar and other key figures were not captured and the fears that Terrorists could regroup) a first hand ‘exit strategy’ was ignored. Although it was accepted that US forces would remain for at least 10 years in Afghanistan and that the War on Terror would continue for indefinite period of time. Nonetheless Washington remained cautious not to slip into the trap of a popular Marshall Plan*. A joint statement by President George W. Bush and Russian President Vladimir V. Putin on Afghanistan clarified this issue; “The United States and Russia do not intend to, and cannot, create the future government of Afghanistan. It is up to the Afghans themselves to determine their future.”16 Action spoke louder than words; thence political developments in Afghanistan clearly proved strong US determinism to shape the country’s transition towards a compromising political system. In order to effectively analyse the diverse role of the US in state-building in Afghanistan, I have decoupled political transition, or what is commonly called the ‘democratization’ process, from infrastructural & economical reconstruction efforts that have comparably comprised US policy towards Afghanistan. A: Stabilization and Political Transition: “What we have found in Afghanistan confirms that, far from ending there, our war against terror is only beginning…If we stop now – leaving terror camps intact and terror states unchecked – our sense of security would be false and temporary.”17 President George W. Bush 29.Jan.2002 There were widespread concerns that US air strikes would create a gap for notorious Northern Alliance militias to reestablish their grip on power and that this could push the country back towards the anarchy of 1990s. Washington realized the fact that it could not prevent its anti-Taliban allies from superseding the tangible vacuum which was created by US anti-Taliban air strikes – after all no one could deal with a complete “statelessness” in the absence of Taliban. Nevertheless the US was under wide international pressure not to permit the recurrence of another inter-ethnic civil war in Afghanistan. Human Rights Watch and many other human rights watchdogs constantly warned the spread of retaliatory criminal activities by anti-Taliban forces from November 2001 when Talib forces started surrendering.18 To fill the political vacuum left by the Taliban in December 2001 (a month after the fall of the Taliban) under the auspices of the UN a high profile conference was convened in Bonn Germany where Washington played a determining role in bringing all Afghan political factions, except the Taliban, to negotiate post-conflict power-sharing. Frankly, the victorious Northern Alliances were unwilling to loosen their tight grip on power easily and to provide other ethnical groups with a share in the post-Taliban power structure. In order to form a balanced political system which could satisfy the Afghan multi-ethnic community requirements, State Department was obliged to orchestrate coercive diplomacy whereby negotiators at Bonn were directed to choose a new chairman for Interim Administration. It is widely believed that Washington (not the people of Afghanistan as mentioned in President Bush & Putin’s joint statement) had a big-hand in the appointment of Hamid Karzai as Afghanistan’s Interim Administrator. Michael Moore in his controversial documentary, Fahrenheit 9/11, introduces Hamid Karzai as a representative of US energy corporations. Whatever the exact nature of his secret ties with US, Karzai appeared to be an ideal administrator who smoothly led the political transition as determined at the Bonn accords. Although Washington succeeded to pass Hamid Karzai as Interim Administrator in December 2001 who peacefully superseded Burhanuddin Rabbani with relatively symbolic authority, the actual power of Northern Alliances remained within the Panjshiri circle with their mercenaries at hand in the capital, Kabul. In an interview with CNN the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, admitted the unbalanced structure of power under Hamid Karzai’s leadership, though he defined this as a trivial issue that should not undermine the overall positive developments which War on Terror had given to Afghanistan.19 Washington knew that the allied warlords in anti-Taliban campaign would eventually threaten the formation of a pluralistic political system based on democratic principles, meanwhile there were widespread fears that the factional militias would ultimately destabilize the country – having this rational calculus in mid 2002 State Department hired dozens of American bodyguards to protect President Karzai against any possible attack. Post-Taliban politics were unsurprisingly fragmented and unviable, warlords and other militia leaders succeeded in re-establishing separate fiefdoms in the absence of functioning central authority. Severe human rights violations; structural violence, totalitarian ruling; and many other warlordish events continued to shape the new multifaceted reality of governance. Initially the US appeared extraordinarily cautious not to get involved in domestic conflict resolution efforts. According to many US officials, the US forces had a clear mandate – hunt down Alqaeda and Taliban. However in December 2001 Washington welcomed United Nation Security Counsel’s (UNSC) resolution No. 1386 which demanded the deployment of International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) to Kabul. In spire of ISAF’s deployment US forces maintained their separate and autonomous command structure and Washington rejected the idea of using over 15,000 of its ground forces for peace-keeping operations. One US diplomat is quoted as having said: “We go in, we hunt down terrorists, and we go out as if we’d never been there.”20 Warlords’ Democratization: THERE WERE HIGH EXPECTATIONS THAT TRANSITIONAL LOYA-JIRGHA (grand assembly) which, according to Bonn agreement (December 2001), had to be convened six months after the establishment of Interim Administration would radically reform the political structure and would end the dominant military fraction grip on power. However it became clear that the US was not willing to risk the warlords’ antagonism, thus another political compromise was reached in the interests of the warlords in August 2002. A prompt analytical document released on the outcomes of Loya-Jirgha by the New York based Human Rights Watch said “Afghanistan's warlords are stronger today then they were ten days ago before the loya jirga started, Short term political expediency has clearly triumphed over human rights.” 21 Keeping in mind the realities of Afghanistan from one side and realistically analysing the fundamental role of US as key actor in post-Taliban decisions, it can be argued that the inclusion of warlords in power structures and providing them with the freedom to exercise and expand their undemocratic rule was in fact another ‘Washington policy flaw’. While a key architect of President Bush’s foreign policy has recently admitted the occurrence of “thousands of tactical errors*” in post-Saddam Iraq, I would argue that US policy makers made hundreds, if not thousands, of similar errors in Afghanistan too. In Afghanistan US officials maintained cordial relationship with local warlords that constantly undermined the consolidation of democratic institutions and blocked the rehabilitation of a pluralistic civil society*. The US friendly policy provided Afghan warlords with the opportunities to manipulate the transitional process and block democratic reforms, additionally warlords created their autonomous areas; refused to pay levies and other domestic incomes to the capital; committed wide and systematic human rights violations; institutionalized the activities of the narcotics mafia; maintained unlawful trans-border relations; and of course threatened, harassed and policed civilians. Under the auspices of warlords and other undemocratic leaders in late 2005 Afghanistan concluded its transitional milestones to hold presidential and parliamentary elections, according to a HRW survey published by Guardian around 60% of the country’s newly elected parliament members have links to warlordims.22 US – Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Afghanistan confronts important challenges to its security and its efforts to build a government based on democratic principles, respect for human rights, and a market economy. To address these challenges, Afghanistan proposed that the United States join in a strategic partnership and establish close cooperation, including regular, high-level exchanges on the political, security, and economic issues contained herein and other issues of mutual interest. The United States and Afghanistan plan to work together to develop appropriate arrangements and agreements to implement their strategic partnership.23 As a BBC journalist in May 2005 – I remember the joyful face of President Hamid Karzai when he boasted as to the substantial implications of the US – Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Declaration (UASPD) which was signed by him and President Bush at the White House. The UASPD is a 3-page document which states US long-term commitment to the consolidation of democracy and governance, security and economical development of Afghanistan. Nevertheless the UASPD tacitly declines US commitment to a Marshal Plan type state-building project for Afghanistan. UASPD also gives an ambiguous account of US annual reconstruction aid which may bolster developmental efforts in a war-ravaged country. With a long US tradition of ‘declarations’ in mind (most of which either face rejection by Congress or do not bring anything in deed) one may dare doubt the practical effectiveness of UASPD particularly as far as the asymmetrical rights and obligations are concerned. Nevertheless it would be unfair to undermine the positive aspects of UASPD. It seems that the essence of UASPD and the scale of commitments willingly accepted by the US have demonstrated radical changes in the US policy towards Afghanistan. B: INFRASTRUCTURAL RECONSTRUCTION SEVERELY DEVASTATED TH, ELUSIVE DEVELOPMENT 23 years of perpetual war severely devastated the economy, physical infrastructure, and nearly all other functions in Afghanistan - long before US attacks the country had embraced institutional collapse. For the first time in 2004 the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) released Afghanistan’s Human Development Report (HDR) in which a shocking picture of human-security is unveiled. According to the report the country has the world’s highest mortality rate; one among every 7 children dies before 5; over half of the population live with less than 1 dollars a day; and many other disappointing facts.24 Many American writers commented on anti-Taliban strikes as “‘bombardment of tents” due to lack of infrastructural capacities in Afghanistan. The invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 was in fact the revelation of a complex humanitarian emergency that caused the US and the rest of the international community to engage in multi-dimensional rebuilding efforts. On 22 January 2002 an international conference of donors was held in Tokyo where US$ 1.8 billion was pledged by over 57 participant countries.25 It is indeed surprising to know that from October to December 2001 the US spent over US$ 10 billion on anti-Taliban strikes while pledged only US$ 290 million for reconstruction. However it can be argued that lack of executive mechanisms or state institutional incapability which could materialize huge sums of funds in effective reconstruction projects and the absence of transparent capacities which could provide accountability in spending aid monies might have convinced Washington to commit low amount for reconstruction. Thus UN and numerous other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organization (IOs) appeared to be the single option through which funds could be channelled both to the needy people as relief and to the Interim Administration as means to restore state functions. It was (and unfortunately is) a rather uncoordinated, ambiguous and loose mechanism which lacked both accountability and effectiveness at large. One American academic wrote “…most donor countries or agencies, notably the USA, have maintained separate spending mechanisms and procedures that are accountable to its own political authority.”26 The continuation of this ineffective mechanism in the last four years not only damaged state capacity building efforts it has generated widespread public antagonism with regard to corruption and mismanagement of international funds. Due to lack of investment in ‘state capacity building’ and ineffective project implementation mechanisms of donors & NGOs institutions have remained weak and dysfunctional which have in turn brought about intangible developmental outcomes. Even in February 2006 at Afghanistan Compact,* donors left uncertain impression on Afghan state’s capacity to efficiently materialize billions of assistance money in coming five years. Former Finance minister of Afghanistan Ashraf Ghani is quoted to have criticized the way NGOs and IOs trade-off qualified Afghan civil servants by their attractive salaries. Accordingly another expert has feared that “Aid outside the budgetary control of the national government may block growth of state fiscal capacity, capital accumulation and economic management, undermining the state’s accountability to citizens.”27 A clear example of donors’ mismanagement can be tracked at the USAID Kabul – Kandahar highway re-asphalting project of September 2003. USAID contracted another American company to manage the highway project, the latter then subcontracted five other companies to execute the job – the result was poor, unstandardized re-asphalting and a huge amount of money robbed by unaccountable procedures. It is interesting to note that four years after the official commencement of reconstruction process in Afghanistan with billions of aid dollars spent, not even 10% of the capital Kabul has received regular power supplies, drinking water, telecommunication, and many other social facilities. Ineffective, and in many cases corrupt, reconstruction has not only brought about intangible development it has prolonged Afghanistan’s full dependence on external aid – an old ‘rentier’ state. 90% of 2005’s US$ 550 million Ordinary Budget relied on external aid while the Developmental Budget totally relied upon foreign assistance. Afghanistan state national budget 2003: source ministry of finance, Afghanistan. http://www.mof.gov.af/english http://www.mof.gov.af/english The United States has a leading role in liberalization & privatization of Afghanistan’s macro economy. Under World Bank and IMF Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) dozens of State Enterprises have been either annulled or privatized and the country’s legal structured has been updated according to the neo-liberal market principles. Numerous American companies are working with various Afghan institutions to reintroduce liberal laws; reform organizational structures; and build technologized capacities. US forces have maintained training and partly facilitated a new Afghan National Army (ANA) and Police (ANP) – yet the US has declined to provide these forces with American weaponry and other infrastructural requirements. ANA and ANP receive their salaries and logistical requirements mainly from American Generals – one scholar has rightly doubted the Afghan state’s ability to maintain its military when US support comes to an end.28 It would be naïve to consider the US a single player in Afghanistan’s reconstruction project: European Union, Japan, India, international organizations like Asian Development Ban (ADB) and many other actors have small-and-big stakes in post-conflict rehabilitation. It is therefore argued that Afghanistan has embraced a sort of internationalized (compared to Iraq) reconstruction programme in which the UN has the crucial duty of overall coordination. Nevertheless due to its outstanding global position and because thousands of its soldiers are on the ground – the US has a rather profound leading position in directing the ways reconstruction, development and political transition is guided. So, how is it going now, and what needs to be done? A Personal Conclusion: “Afghanistan is our new West Germany.” 29 In the beginning of 21st century politics is still not totally replaced by science therefore it would be bizarre to solidly predict Afghanistan becoming another Germany or a second Vietnam. Perhaps a sound judgement of the current situation in Afghanistan is highlighted by the latest US national security strategy where it is written: “We have kept on the offensive against terrorist networks, leaving our enemy weakened, but not yet defeated.”30 Taliban have lost their grip on political power; Afghan children go to school now; men can shave and women can work outside; a constitution has been enacted – a president and a parliament elected; and a new economy introduced – yet if the impact of these impressive achievements are examined in every day’s life in many parts of Afghanistan a gloomy picture of a war-torn nation that stands at the top bottom of UNDP global human development indicators would be revealed. A detailed measurement of development accomplished by Centre for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) in 2005 signified the insufficient scale of reconstruction delivered since 2002: “despite significant developments since the fall of Taliban, yet Afghanistan has not reached a Viable Zone.”31 As usual Afghanistan seems to be experiencing an uncoordinated, indescribable, and in some circumstances a pass-the-back sort of policy from Washington. The majority of US-based policymakers and bureaucrats do not yet recognize the complexities of realities in Afghanistan. In Martha Brill Olcott’s words: “…it is difficult to find evidence that the administration has a real understanding of what it would take to transform Afghanistan into an economically viable country that is not a security threat to its neighbours.”32 Nevertheless Washington spins bring in Afghanistan as “accomplished mission” a justification of President Bush’s destructive internationalism. It seems that perpetual failures and a deteriorating post-conflict picture of Iraq oblige US officials to cling to Afghanistan and boast about the fable of its successes. During his short visit to Kabul on 1st March 2006 President George W. Bush said: “I hope the people of Afghanistan understand that as democracy takes hold, you're inspiring others. And that inspiration will cause others to demand their freedom.”33 Yet this inspiring nation has a comparatively insignificant place in President Bush’s budgets for Iraq and Afghanistan operations despite the fact that Afghanistan has even broader requirements (both in terms of security and political transition) than those of Iraq. Rome was not built in a day! We need to be realistic. The reconstruction of a country like Afghanistan that, for decades, has experienced institutional and physical devastation is not a piece of cake. The conditions in Afghanistan are far more complicated than Washington might have considered. Not only does Afghanistan need billions of dollars in aid to revive its economical infrastructure, it also requires US long-term political as well as military support to consolidate democracy and preserve broader human security. Successful ‘state building’ is not solely a process of what an observer refers to as “transferring cash”34. Building consolidated liberal-democracies in the Islamic world (US agenda for 21st century) would require Washington policymakers to develop capacities; generously invest in infrastructural projects; build confidence (win hearts and minds); respect local values and abide by the law; keep patience for the changes to take place; and of course expect and tolerate sacrifices. Now here comes a fundamental question raised by an American scholar: “Is Afghanistan worth the expense and trouble for America?”35 A hasty “No” would definitely be an irrational response. Afghanistan is a rare country which has, for the last three decades, received billions of dollars from the US spent on variety of projects. Yet the biggest attack on US soil was masterminded from Afghanistan. In our astonishingly interdependent world the presence of a weak and collapsing state in Afghanistan would in no doubt threaten US vital interests throughout the world. The authors of the ‘Rebuilding Weak States’ article have rightly argued: “…state building is not an act of simple charity but a smart investment in the United States’ own safety and stability.”36 Bibliography and notes: 1):- Precarious Life: The powers of mourning and violence: Judith Butler: Verso publication 2004; pp.5 2):- US and Afghanistan by Martha Brill Olcott: Carnegie Endowment for international peace: http://www.carnegieendowment 3):- The embassy of Afghanistan
in Washington DC; http://www.embassyofafghanistan 4):- A Bitter Harvest – US foreign policy and Afghanistan: Tom Lansford: 2003 Ashgate Publication USA: pp. 71 5) US State Department: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei 6):- Afghanistan: Crosslines Essential Field Guides to humanitarian and conflict zone: Edward Girardet and Jonathan Walter: 2nd Edition –Crosslines Publication 2004: pp117 7):- Afghanistan the labyrinth of violence: Amalendu Misra: Polity Publication 2004 UK: pp. 27 8):- Afghanistan the labyrinth of violence: Amalendu Misra: Polity Publication 2004 UK: pp. 52 9):- Afghanistan the labyrinth of violence: Amalendu Misra: Polity Publication 2004 UK: pp. 53 10):- Afghanistan the labyrinth of violence: Amalendu Misra: Polity Publication 2004 UK: pp. 88 11):- Alex Callinicos: The New Mandarins of American Power:Polity Publication UK 2003; pp. 10 12) Zalmay Khalilzad American Ambassador
and President Bush’s Special Enjoy to Afghanistan, and
many other visiting US officials admitted ‘policy mistakes’ towards
Afghanistan between 1989 – 2001: http://www.bbc.co.uk/pashto 13):-
President George W. Bush speaking at joint press briefing with
Afghan President Hamid Karzai – The East Room White House
23 May 2005 – the press release can be accessed at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news
14) Michael A. McFaul; The Other
Half of the Job: Carnegie Endowment for international peace; http://www.carnegieendowment 15):-
Barnet Rubin; From Nation-Building To State-Building – Peace
building and state-building in Afghanistan: http://www.metapress.com/media 16):- Joint Statement by President
George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on Afghanistan;
Office of the Press Secretary – the White House November 13, 2001; http://www.whitehouse.gov/news 17):- President George Bush Weekly
Radio Message: text can be viewed at: http://www.whitehouse.gov 18):- Human Rights Watch 2002 Report
on Situation in Afghanistan; http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/asia1 19):- CNN’s interview with
Colin Powel; 2001 – text of the iv can be accessed at: http://www.state.gov/secretary 20):- US Diplomat Quoted in: Think Again: Nation Building, By Marina S. Ottaway; Foreign Policy magazine, Sep/Oct 2002 – the article can be found at: www.carnegieendowment.org : download date: 01.04.06 21):- Afghanistan: Analysis of New
Cabinet: HRW June 2002: http://hrw.org/english/docs 22):- The Guardian UK online article
can be accessed at: http://www.guardian.co.uk 23):- Joint Declaration of the United
States-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership; Office of the Press
Secretary, the White House - May 23, 2005: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news 24):- Afghanistan’s First
ever National Human Development Report can be viewed at: http://www.undp.org.af/nhdr_04 25):- The International Conference
on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan Tokyo 22 – 23
January 2002; a related document can be viewed at the Japanese
ministry of foreign affairs webpage: http://www.mofa.go.jp/region 26):- Barnet Rubin, Centre for International
Cooperation, New York University, New York, USA: From Nation-Building
to State-Building in Afghanistan. The thesis can be viewed
from; http://www.metapress.com/media 27):- Barnet Rubin; From Nation-Building
To State-Building – Peace building and state-building
in Afghanistan:http://www.metapress.com/media 28):- Barnet Rubin; From Nation-Building
To State-Building – Peace building and state-building
in Afghanistan:http://www.metapress.com/media 29):- Michael A. McFaul; The Other
Half of the Job – published on 5th February
05 at Washington post: text can be downloaded from: dd. 02.04.06 http://www.carnegieendowment 30):- The National Security Strategy
of United States 2006; this document can be downloaded from: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc 31):- Centre for Strategic International Studies SCIS, July 2005: In The Balance: Measuring Progress in Afghanistan: Summary Report prepared for International Organization of Migration; pp4 32):- Martha Brill Oclott, ‘US
and Afghanistan’: Afghanistan Peace building in a Regional
Perspective, Bergen, Norway 22-24 September 2002: text of the
article can be viewed at: http://www.carnegieendowment 33):- President Bush speaking at
joint press availability with his Afghan counterpart, Hamid
Karzai, 1st March 2006, the press release can be
found at White House’s official webpage: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news 34):- Stuart Eizenstat, John Edward Porter and Jeremy M. Weinstein - ‘Rebuilding Weak States’ in Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2005, Vol. 84 Issue 1, p134-146 35:-) William Dowell, ‘Blowing Hot and Cold: 20 years of US foreign policy’ in Afghanistan – Crosslines essential field guide to humanitarian and conflict zones; 2nd edition – Media Action International Publication Geneva 2004; pp.122 36:-) Stuart Eizenstat, John Edward Porter and Jeremy M. Weinstein - ‘Rebuilding Weak States’ in Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2005, Vol. 84 Issue 1, p134-146 The views expressed in the contributed
papers are that of the writer (s) and are not necessarily shared by
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