By Dr. Annette Ittig2

Abstract:  Globally, urban populations have doubled since the 1980s, and the developing world in particular is rapidly urbanizing.  This trend is also seen in Afghanistan, where some 30% of the people are thought to live in urban or periurban centers.  Afghanistan’s urbanization has accelerated following the country’s dramatic regime changes over the past three years.  Kabul City, for example, has grown from some 500,000 people in 2001 to an estimated 3,000,000 at the end of 2004.  It is in Kabul that the country’s most significant urban challenges are seen, including rapid population growth, the destruction of much of the city’s physical infrastructure due to war and lack of maintenance, land tenure issues, a sharp increase in land prices and rents, a shortage of low-income housing and a high rate of unemployment.  Although Urban Infrastructure is a priority National Development Program in Afghanistan’s National Development Framework, donors tend to view development through a rural perspective.  Urban development is therefore not presently a donor priority for Afghanistan, and such monies as are available for urgent urban infrastructure needs and job creation schemes are not sufficiently coordinated or strategic.  This article provides overviews of Kabul’s urban planning challenges and of the key players in the urban sector.  It also summarizes some of the strategies for the urban revitalization process that will be essential to Afghanistan’s socio-economic reconstruction.

Globally, urban populations have doubled since the 1980s, and the rate of urbanization is particularly rapid in the developing world.  This trend is also seen in Afghanistan, where some 30% of the people are thought to live in urban or periurban centers.  Kabul City, for example, has grown from approximately 500,000 people in 2001 to an estimated 3,000,000 at the end of 2004.

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Urban Challenges

Afghanistan’s urbanization has accelerated following the country’s dramatic regime changes over the past three years.  Afghanistan’s urban centers are key to its reconstruction, as cities are acknowledged to be the engines of economic growth.  Urban centers generate employment, especially in the service sectors; and they provide significant opportunities for private sector investment.  Furthermore, cities are generally the focal points for social and cultural development.  In order to maximize the potential of Afghanistan’s cities, however, various pressing urban issues must be addressed and managed.  It is in the capital city Kabul that the country’s greatest urban challenges are found, and they include:

• Rapid Population Growth.   Kabul’s most urgent urban planning issues are linked to its rapid population growth.  This is in part due to the influx of returning refugees following the end of the Taliban regime and the establishment of the Interim Government of Afghanistan in late 2001.  Moreover, migrants from other parts of the country have also flocked into the city, seeking employment, public services and/or agency assistance in the wake of the opportunities offered by the new government and by the many international organizations involved in security and reconstruction activities who have established offices there since December 2001.  

Kabul’s current population is therefore quite heterogeneous, in contrast to most of Afghanistan’s more homogeneous rural communities.  Unlike their pre-1978 profiles, few Kabul neighbourhoods are now inhabited exclusively by people from any one particular place or group.  More commonly, diverse populations live in proximity in the same area.  They may include both “newcomers” and “original residents”, and tensions may exist between them. 

• Destruction of physical infrastructure.   Much of Kabul’s physical infrastructure has been destroyed following decades of conflict and lack of maintenance.  This has created housing shortages and service delivery backlogs resulting in, for example, a lack of clean water supply and urban traffic congestion
• There is a  shortage of low income housing.  This has encouraged the spread of unserviced, informal, or squatter, settlements throughout Kabul (Figure 1).  It is estimated that as many as half of the city’s population live in squatter settlements.  In Kabul, squatters do not necessarily live rent-free.  As virtually all land in the city is claimed by one or more owners, who may be individuals, companies or government institutions, squatter households are usually obliged to pay some amount to remain on a property.  For example, families squatting in an area claimed by a ministry may be required to pay a representative of that ministry a fee – which may be off the books – in order not to be removed from their squat.

It is unclear what percentage of working poor households have been obliged to move from one neighbourhood to another due to their inability to pay rising rents.  In addition to those whose standards of living are declining but who can still afford rental accommodation, there are also “evictees”, who may be jobless internally displaced persons (“IDPs”) or returning refugees, and who constitute another category of the urban poor.  Their homelessness is the result of, variously, land seizures, increasing rents, low-income housing shortages, and a high unemployment rate.

• Sharp increases in land prices and rents, as aid, commercial, military and other organizations with international currency operating funds move into Kabul.  Land speculation has led to a proliferation of high rise, high rent buildings owned by Afghan merchants and powerbrokers (Figures 2, 3).  These energy-dependent, multi-storey structures are in sharp contrast to the city’s widespread squatter settlements, and they are symbolic of the wealth disparities (and tensions) in the city.  Often these new buildings are not in compliance with extant municipal zoning or building codes.  There are, however, currently no effective mechanisms for the enforcement of these regulations.
• There are significant land tenure issues, including property disputes arising from war and regime changes.  Such disputes have sometimes resulted in evictions and land seizures, e.g. the September 2003 evictions from land owned by the Ministry of Defense in the Shirpur area of Kabul City.  For additional details on Shirpur and web links, see below, “Kabul City High Commission”.
• There is a dearth of potable water for the city’s growing needs.  This situation was initially a consequence of the drought which has plagued the country since 1999.  The increase in Kabul’s population and the shortage of water/sanitation infrastructure have exacerbated it.  Consequently, waterborne diseases are widespread.
• revenues currently available to the urban sector are not sufficiently harmonized, focused or strategic enough to comprehensively carry out necessary long-term infrastructure upgrading and job creation schemes;
• at both the national and sub-national levels, human resource capacity in the urban sector is insufficient
• Inadequate donor coordination.    Donor priorities and projects are not always well coordinated.  At the grassroots level, there is often duplication of activities by implementing partners.  Moreover, donors and implementing agencies still often appear to act in parallel, rather than in support of, established national and subnational bodies.  This can be seen as a holdover from the Taliban era when, in the absence of a widely internationally recognized regime, NGOs and UN agencies augmented public services.
• urban management is fragmented among several ministries and other institutions.

There has been growing public pressure upon the Afghan Government for tangible reconstruction results, particularly in Kabul.  This was especially noticeable in the period leading up to the October 2004 elections.  Acknowledging the scale and immediacy of these issues, the Interim, and then the Transitional, Islamic State of Afghanistan has included the Urban Management National Development Programme (“NDP”)’s subprogramme of National Urban Infrastructure as a priority within the country’s National Development Framework (“NDF”)3.  Further details on the NDF, including priority programs and commitments, are available on the Afghanistan Government website at www.afghanistangov.org. 

Key players in the Urban Sector

 Among the key municipal and national actors in the urban sector are the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing (“MUDH”), Kabul Municipality and the Kabul City High Commission.  Additional national stakeholders include the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Public Works, and the Ministry of Water and Energy. 

Other players include international donors and international financial institutions (“IFIs”) and the Urban Sector Consultative Group, as well as implementing partners, e.g. UN agencies, international NGOs, local NGOs, and Afghan and other contracting firms.  Linked to MUDH there are as well six semi-private state-owned enterprises (“SOE”s), at least two of which, Afghan Construction Company and Banai Construction Company, are large landholders and landlords in Kabul.

 At the grassroots there are community groups, or shuras, in each of the city’s 18 nahias, or “districts”, and in most of the 470-odd nieghbourhoods within these districts4.  Many of these community shuras were initiated by UN agencies and NGOs, both local and international, to assist in project implementation.  Furthermore, in each neighbourhood, or gozar, there are wakils, or “headmen”, whose authority is generally based on local patronage.

The Ministry of Urban Development and Housing (“MUDH”) is responsible for sound urban management, including facilitating access to housing for all of Afghanistan's citizens. In order to carry out these tasks, MUDH is mandated by the Government to prepare appropriate policies, programmes and projects, as well as the Urban Management Sector portion of the National Development Budget (the “NDB” – the “aid” budget).   MUDH is also tasked with coordinating, monitoring and assessing all projects in the urban sector, and reporting back to donors, the Ministry of Finance and the Cabinet.

Kabul Municipality is headed by the Mayor of Kabul, and its employees include the directors of various departments such as roads and planning, and the administrators of each of the city’s 18 districts. The Municipality owns, or is in a position to sell, significant amounts of “public” or “state” land throughout the city.  Moreover, the Municipality claims responsibility for housing, land assessment and ownership records, as well as for urban roads and water supply.  Furthermore, the municipality claims the revenue collection for all of these services.  In an environment where land tenure is often in dispute and where regulations may be unclear, allegations about the Municipality’s sales of land, its unsystematic provision of land ownership documents, and its idiosyncratic collection of revenues have led to charges of favouritism and conflicts of interest.  As of this writing, the Kabul Municipality structure is under review and reform, and several key staff have recently been replaced.

Kabul City High Commission (“KCHC”) is composed of representatives from the various ministries involved in urban affairs and governance such as MUDH, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Interior, as well as the Mayor of Kabul City.  The KCHC’s decision-making authority extends to decisions on public, or state, land use, including evictions, e.g. the Shirpur evictions in September 2003 from land owned by the Ministry of Defense.  The Shirpur land was later made available to various members of the KCHC and others for nominal fees.  This led to charges of corruption and conflict of interest against those parties5.  For additional details on the Shirpur evictions, see www.reliefweb.int “Interview with the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Housing”, dated September 12, 2003.

The Consultative Group (“CG”) for the Urban Management sector is comprised of donor representatives, the Minister and Deputy Minister of MUDH, stakeholders from Kabul Municipality and UN agencies and NGOs as well as expatriate and national MUDH advisors.  The CG is tasked with assisting MUDH with policy and programme development, budget preparation and monitoring and evaluating Urban Sector projects.  These and other issues are discussed in the CG meetings, the minutes of which are available on the Afghanistan Government website at www.afghanistangov.org.

Theoretically, the CG provides one means of assisting MUDH to ensure project coordination in the urban sector.  In practice, this mechanism is not yet as effective as originally envisaged, particularly with regard to large donor and IFI activities.

The Urban Management portion of the NDB and the Project Cycle

The Urban Management portion of the NDB includes only those activities for which aid is requested.  It includes both grants and loans to the Government.  Within the budget, these two categories of funding are not distinguished.  For the fiscal year 1383-84 (2004-2005), there are approximately 100 projects in the NDB’s Urban Sector.  The total budget requirement for these projects is some US $400 million. 

Further information on NDB projects, donors and commitments is provided in the Donor Assistance Database, or “DAD”, which is accessible through www.afghanistangov.org. 

The Project Cycle:  For aid-funded, or IFI-loan funded, projects, the cycle works from the top down, initially from donor/IFI to the MUDH and CG for discussion and for the initial approval for inclusion in the budget.  Projects are then presented to the Ministry of Finance for final approval.  Proposals may be presented to the MUDH/CG by any member of the CG, including donors, IFIs, implementing partners, the MUDH Minister, his Deputy Minister, or by the Afghan or expatriate Technical Advisors to the Ministry.  Should either the MUDH or Kabul Municipality propose a project, they must also identify donor support prior to the submission of their proposal to the Ministry of Finance.  Project-approved funding flows from donor/lender to the implementing partner.6

There is generally more than one level of project partnership, and the amount actually received for a project at the field level can be significantly less than what was originally allocated by  the donor.  For administrative and oversight purposes, donors may prefer to disburse funds to multilateral agencies for example, a UN agency.  As the latter are usually not operational agencies, they will transfer monies to an international or local implementing partner, usually an NGO.  Each agency involved in this process will collect an administrative fee.  Salaries for agency staff, particularly expatriates, and related costs such as accommodation, transportation and security, account for a large, if not the largest, portion of any aid-funded project budget.

Projects proposed for the current FY range from water/sanitation systems, road repair and construction, restoration and revitalization of Kabul’s historic old town to proposals for residential/commercial complexes and a themed amusement park for Kabul City.7  Donors have only recently decided that programming in Afghanistan should include development as well as relief interventions; and the changeover from one type of programming is ongoing. Urban sector projects reflect this duality.  While some are developmental and involve long-term commitments, others are still “emergency” in nature, e.g. “Quick Impact Projects”.  Others reflect an exclusively technical perspective on urban problem solving, without consideration of local socio-economic factors or community capabilities.  Finally, some project parallel the services which should be provided by national and sub-nation al bodies.  As there is now a recognized Government of Afghanistan, projects offering support to and capacity building of ministries and municipalities would be more relevant activities.

The top-down project cycle system allows little room for expression of grassroots needs and priorities in project formulation.  However, approval by both the district administrator as well as the specific neighbourhood wakil is required before any aid project can be implemented.  Furthermore, many agencies depend on local wakils for the identification of beneficiaries for their projects.  It is not therefore surprising that households’ receipts of agency assistance are often proportionately linked to their relationship with their neighbourhood wakil. 

Lack of clarity for responsibilities in the Urban Sector: The responsibilities and priorities of MUDH often overlap with various other ministries, including those of Public Works and Returnees and Refugees. In relation to municipal authorities, such as the Kabul Municipality, while the MUDH's focus is envisaged as being policy, programmes and legislation, the municipalities are seen as primarily implementing partners.   As of this writing, there is still no clear delineation of responsibilities between MUDH and the municipalities or between MUDH and other ministries.  Such clarification is essential, if revenues from land, traffic and other user fees are to be efficiently and effectively collected and utilized, and if those funds are to be recycled into the urban sector for infrastructure maintenance and civil service salaries.

Strategies for Urban Revitalization.

While unique in their specifics, the urban planning issues noted above are not unlike those seen in other transitional, or “recovering” states, for example, in East Timor or Lebanon.  Indeed, these challenges are not uncommon in developing countries globally.  At the macro level, the national priority strategies for urban revitalization, as expressed through MUDH, are similar to those seen in other rapidly urbanizing, “postconflict” states, and they include:

• town planning:  this encompasses transportation networks, potable water, sewage management systems and shelter for planned neighbourhoods as well as upgrading services for informal or squatter settlements.  As part of this strategy, policies for regularizing and providing security of land tenure in informal settlements are also under consideration.
• mass employment creation through public works programmes, e.g. the UNDF Recovery Employment Afghanistan Programme (“REAP”)

• more public -private sector partnerships, including both foreign and local investors, to raise the substantial monies that will be required for investment in urban infrastructure, services, housing and job creation.  In this regard, it is encouraging that draft legislation on foreign investments is now under consideration; and that there are – as of this writing – two international banks open in Kabul for both commercial and personal banking. 

Public-private partnerships can be complex, and Afghanistan’s investment law has not, as of this writing, been amended to allow for the tracking of domestic investment funds.  It will therefore be essential for the Government, perhaps through the Ministry of Finance, to exercise a high level of vigilance over such partnerships, to exclude any possibility that they could become vehicles for laundering money.

• Building the capacity of urban sector professional and support staff and increasing salaries to be competitive with the private sector.  Many senior staff at MUDH and other Kabul departments have served for over twenty years, and collectively they represent an institutional memory and local knowledge base which will be invaluable for the reconstruction process.  It is crucial that these skilled, experienced staff be retained.

Salaries for professional MUDH and some other civil service servants were increased under the Public Restructuring and Reform (“PRR”) program in March-April 2004.  However, these increases are not yet competitive with the NGO and private sectors, and many civil servants are still obliged to take on additional employment to meet the rising costs of living in Kabul.  Moreover, the PRR increases are valid only for two years.  This timeline reflects the pledges of donors supporting the fund from which the salary increases are drawn.

Finally, capacity building also requires a change in the administrative context if it is to be more than just “skills upgrading”.  This is a lengthy process and, as noted above with PRR salary increases, not one which fits well into donors’ usual single fiscal year budgets.

• Restoration and revitalization of historic urban centers, including commercial and residential areas.  Over the longer term, it is hoped that this will as well generate tourism revenues.

MUDH is responsible for developing specific policies to support the above strategies.  However, Afghanistan’s still-evolving political and economic environments, a fragmented urban management and weak financial and human resource capacity all challenge the Ministry’s policy formulation and its enforcement ability.

One of the most productive ways of bringing communities together is by identifying and managing problems acknowledged as common, such as a lack of clean water or health concerns. For example, many of the household surveys and case studies conducted by aid agencies and others in Kabul over the past several years have demonstrated that, among the families considered most vulnerable (either by their low level of per capita income or by low per capita expenditure), health care is a major expense8.   One of the most frequently mentioned health concerns is waterborne diseases.   This health issue provides agencies with a window of opportunity to act as facilitators in strengthening social networks to address communal problems through participatory projects, e.g. the installation and maintenance of hand pumps for water.   This concept is not alien to the culture:  it is rooted in the traditional Afghan custom of hashar, communal labour which is offered without charge towards constructing a neighbourhood facility, such as a mosque, or to assist a neighour in need.  Furthermore, such community level interventions have a proven track record in Afghanistan; and they were successfully utilized in various aid agency interventions in Kabul City and elsewhere during the Taliban era.9 

One challenge to building on the capacities of local people for communal problem solving is that local powerbrokers, such as the neighbourhood wakils, may try to exploit such opportunities to dispense patronage to their own client group.  Agencies must be vigilant about this possibility, and they must be flexible and creative in their selection criteria for neighbourhoods and beneficiaries.

Summary and Conclusions.  Afghanistan’s most dramatic urban planning challenges are see in Kabul, and they include rapid population growth, the destruction of physical infrastructure, a shortage of low income housing, sharp increases in land prices and rents, land tenure issues and a fragmented urban management.  While unique in their particulars, these concerns are not uncommon in other post-war countries or in the developing world generally. 

The current regime in Afghanistan was established only three years ago, and the Government is still building its capacity to coordinate and monitor programs and projects.  The implementation of urban strategies may not therefore proceed in as timely a fashion as desired by planners, donors and Afghan citizens.  Some of the types and consequences of institutional fragility in the urban sector have been noted above.  Institution building and structural reform are long-term, complex processes, and the Government’s demonstrated commitment to them is promising (see, for example, note 4, above).

Another challenge to the implementation of urban planning strategies is that revenues currently available to the sector – whether from taxes, aid, loans or private investment – are not sufficiently coordinated, focused or strategic to undertake the types of long-term, comprehensive development projects that are necessary.  This is particularly unfortunate in the case of aid funding.  Donors tend to view development through a rural perspective, and urban development is not presently a donor priority for Afghanistan.  Yet Afghanistan’s stability depends, in part, upon people in urban areas having employment as well as livable environments.

The mantra of “poverty is a root cause of terrorism” is now fashionable among policy makers, and previous analyses of post-war institutional approaches to urban reconstruction10 demonstrate that strategic and extended support – as well as equitable local partnerships – are required for this process.  Yet donor governments have still not adequately acknowledged that urban revitalization is essential to Afghanistan’s reconstruction and stability.  As events over the past decade in that country and elsewhere demonstrate, international stakeholders cannot afford not to invest and work with local actors towards this goal.