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Afghan Reconstruction Talk Fever
By Dr. G. Rauf
Roashan
Abstract:
Approaching the issue of reconstruction can be a complicated
process, which would require active participation of the
authority in power in Afghanistan and a unified approach by
all others interested in the process. Haphazard convening of
conferences here and there, in America, Europe, Asia and
Australia, to outdo rival groupings in talks about
reconstruction of Afghanistan my not be what Afghanistan
needs. Afghanistan needs a well-thought, scientifically
developed plan based on priorities and short and long-term
objectives. For the implementation of such a plan she needs
help in establishing true peace and security in the country
and a political structure inclusive of ideals and wishes of
all its citizens. The present reconstruction talk fever may
subside soon if the recommendations emanating from them would
fall on deaf ears inside Afghanistan where it matters.
Flurries of action dominate minds of
Afghan event watchers as new developments unfold in
contemporary Afghan history.
First, there was the hue and cry for
finding of a solution to the Afghan quagmire. Many circles,
Afghan and international, raised their voices, one way or
another, calling for a solution to the Afghan issue to be
found, not by them, but by others for the Afghan tragedy. To
that effect there would be meetings and conferences and
briefings and media manipulations. None of these meetings and
conferences really found or mapped a true solution, until the
fateful Bonn meeting heavily influenced by an injured United
States after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on its
soil, took place.
Then for a short time, there was a flurry
of activity, by position seekers to voice their feelings in
favor of the Bonn proceedings. Well-wishers of the Interim
Authority just wished it well and did nothing more. Did they
have any contributions for its success? Maybe not.
And then there was a flurry of activity
by some groups and individuals to write or suggest new drafts
for the Afghan constitution. Those activities died out with a
hope that they would be revived soon after the proposed Loya
Jirga takes place and decides on a system of government for
Afghanistan.
Then there was the UN-Asian Bank-World
Bank sponsored Tokyo conference that laid the grounds and
provided reasons for much more talk on Afghan reconstruction.
The Tokyo conference concluded with a decision by participants
to promise aid for Afghan reconstruction amounting to $ 4.5
billion for the first five years. This is a lot of money and
attracts a lot of interest by local and international circles,
which are hopeful of claiming their share in this world
investment.
Now, almost everyday there is a
conference here and there, in Washington, D.C., in New York,
in Los Angeles and in Orange County and in San Francisco area
and in Canada and in many European countries like Italy and
Germany and England and Denmark, and in Asia in Pakistan, and
even in Iran and India, to talk about beginning the process of
reconstruction. Many of these are either participated by
Afghans who just want to talk for the sake of talking or
international circles with political agendas like in the case
of Afghanistan’s neighbors or countries of the region. Few
are technicians who would really want to chalk out a course of
action. But even then, who is to buy their product of thought
and affection for the ruined country? The Interim Authority
unfortunately has to face and deal with vast problems of
utmost importance for its own survival and the security of the
nation. It is just not there yet for the reconstruction
groupings and conferences and maybe it doesn’t care.
Then there are international groupings
such as the United Nations and the NGOs. The former is in it
for political purposes as well and the later is there to claim
its part of the reconstruction money. The two groups let the
world believe that they are flawless in their stands, policies
and procedures and there are some NGOs that would like us to
believe that their set up is the best Afghanistan and Afghans
could wish for.
And all of the above collude and sit,
together and apart, to discuss reconstruction. So far none of
the above have posed the essential questions of: What are they
rebuilding? What is the condition of what they are
rebuilding? What is the basic data available so that long and
short-term objectives could be worked out in the
reconstruction plans and measurable goals set up. And who is
to pay heed to their so-called most scientific approaches to
planning for the reconstruction? No body has listed the
prerequisites for implementation of reconstruction plans.
These include the following among others:
- A smoothly working
central and peripheral administration to be in place for the
implementation phase of any plan.
- Security to the
extent that people are free from threats to their lives,
property and honor so that they could participate in the
process of reconstruction.
- Political maturity
to ensure accountability in the implementation process.
- Manpower especially
mid-level technicians to take up the implementation
responsibilities.
- Political process
to include vast sectors of population and economy in the
process.
- A central highly
motivated and professionally oriented and active
organization to approach the process truly in line with
scientific methods of planning with recognition of
constraints, and solution and an ability to work out a list
of true and factual priorities.
The conveners of these
conferences who feverishly try to outdo other groupings
elsewhere in their zeal for just convening the conference need
to think about methods to unify approaches of similar groups
everywhere since they all claim to be working for the same
objective. This unfortunately has not happened so far, nor has
there been an organized effort by the authority in power in
Afghanistan to recognize the need for unifying these haphazard
efforts by Afghans and non-Afghans with the purpose of
benefiting from their inputs and utilizing them as its allies.
With so many meetings and conferences
addressing the same issues again and again without a clear
path in sight for the implementation of their resolutions they
would become frustrated to the degree that the fever would
subside and the naked reality would set in, a reality that may
not be as attractive as the thought of an Afghanistan
reconstructed overnight.
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