Afghans Can Be Our Allies

By BARNETT R. RUBIN
September 22, 2001

As the United States plans an attack against Osama bin Laden and the Taliban regime that continues to shelter him, we need to recognize that destroying Afghanistan will accomplish nothing. The Soviets, the Islamic militants we once armed, and the Taliban and their Pakistani backers have already done so. About a third of the capital, Kabul, is as ruined as the World Trade Center.

Ordinary Afghans have already suffered for years from wartime devastation. Increasing the suffering could fuel more terrorism. A successful American operation against terrorism based in Afghanistan would have to help people there establish a legitimate government and rebuild their country.

Despite the Taliban decision yesterday not to hand over Mr. bin Laden, the suggestion the day before by the Afghan clerics that he leave the country voluntarily may reveal dissension within the leadership.

After all, Afghans did not join that movement in order to wage war on the United States in defense of foreign terrorists. Rather, they were hoping to address the chaos in their country through the imposition of strict Islamic law. Over time, elements of the Taliban developed close ties to non-Afghan militants, but not all want to destroy Afghanistan on their behalf. A month after the Soviet collapse ended aid to Afghanistan's Communist government, its top military commanders mutinied. Some Taliban commanders may similarly now have their fingers to the wind.

The Taliban's chief sponsor, Pakistan, terrified by the consequences to itself of a possible American attack on Afghanistan, should be using all its resources to induce the Taliban leadership to deliver the wanted men. And we must ensure that our own need to respond to last week's horror does not lead us to take actions that stir up Afghan nationalism that will only bolster the Taliban leadership and the foreign extremists to whom it has given safe harbor.

The United States and its allies must also work with two other focal points of Afghan politics: the United Front, the armed resistance led by Ahmed Shah Massoud until his recent assassination, and exiles working with the former king, Zahir Shah, now in Rome, who are trying to convene a loya jirga, or a traditional Afghan assembly. Together, these two forces combine leaders of all the country's ethnic groups. And individuals within them are trying to work together on Afghanistan's political future.

The United Front's forces are in areas dominated by ethnic minorities, but some now involved with Zahir Shah, including former mujahedeen, might also be able to raise troops, including recruits from the predominant Pashtun ethnic group in whose territory Mr. bin Laden's followers are largely based.

This would require international support. The United States should ask Pakistan to guarantee full freedom of action to Afghan leaders who appear capable of establishing a stable government that will meet minimal international standards. In return, these Afghans should acknowledge Pakistan's concerns by, for instance, settling the two countries' longstanding border dispute. The United States could also accede to
Pakistani requests for economic aid and debt relief in exchange for agreeing to these and other conditions, like those relating to American military access.

Simply overthrowing an objectionable government, as the Communists were overthrown in 1992, is not enough. The result then was the anarchy that gave rise to the Taliban and created opportunities for foreign terrorists. This time, the United States and other countries must push for a more stable outcome by planning now for the reconstruction of an Afghanistan governed by legitimate authorities, possibly with the assistance of the
United Nations. This would give Afghans a stake they now lack in the global community. It would also allow the new government to secure the country and win the cooperation of local people in rooting out terrorists.

This will take time, but President Bush has said that he intends to win this war against terrorists and those who harbor them, not engage in halfway measures. To do this, he will need Afghan leaders with a sure knowledge of the country and popular support. Historically, those who have invaded Afghanistan have met ignominious ends. Mr. Bin Laden and his allies may hope that they can draw the United States into the same trap that devoured the Soviet Union. If we lash out militarily without a political plan for Afghanistan, they could achieve this. But we can frustrate their hopes if we recognize that the Afghan people can be our firmest allies in this fight.

Barnett R. Rubin is director of studies at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University.