Tara Kartha, Research Fellow, IDSA
October 2000 Vol. XXIV No. 7 The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, India
Strange as it may seem to the outside observer, the last two decades in the
history of Pakistan and Afghanistan have led to a situation wherein the two
countries are invariably taken together as one. The evolution of the term
"Pakistan-Afghanistan" region in any discussion on narcotics,
terrorism,
money laundering or gun running underlines the extent to which a once
proudly independent country has been subsumed and nearly incorporated into
the ambitious state next door. That such an event has occurred during the
supposedly civilised times that we now live in-when virtual annexations are
considered unthinkable-is difficult to accept. Yet for all practical
purposes, the sinews of the state of Afghanistan lie in Pakistan. The
currency used is Pakistani rupees, its border now no longer exists even on
paper, and much of its "armed forces" are either Pakistani or
linked to
that country in diverse ways.
Yet it is to the constant worry of Pakistani policy-makers, that the
process is not yet complete. One slice of Afghan territory continues to be
held by the recognised government of Afghanistan, that of President
Rabbani, while the rest is under the dubious control of a group that
remains beholden to Pakistan for everything but its name.
Having said as much, it must be noted that the costs to Pakistan of this
"virtual annexation" have been inordinately heavy. There is much to
show
that these costs also include the sacking of a democratic government by a
military that has its own agenda in Afghanistan. Socially, the costs have
been the most obvious, as Pakistan threatens to spin out of control in a
paroxysm of violence that pits different radical religious sects against
each other, in what observers call the "Talibanisation" of
Pakistan.
Diplomatically, Pakistan stands accused by both friends and others of being
the main supporter of terrorism that emanates from Afghanistan.
Economically, the constant violence and mayhem in financial centres like
Karachi has meant a flight of capital and loss of foreign investment.
Politically, the country has been the loser, with democracy once again
hijacked, and the new regime justifying its move on the slogan that the
greatest threat to Pakistan was internal and not external (that this
statement was made at the same time that the army was planning its Kargil
War is another matter).
Two sets of variables, therefore, influence the future Pakistani policy
towards its western neighbour. First, Pakistan has to get its own internal
situation under control and remove armed gangs and around five million
weapons from its streets. In short, the state of Pakistan has to control
the streets and to be seen as doing so. Development and investor confidence
are directly linked to this event. Second, and linked to this is the fact
that investor confidence can hardly invent itself as long as Pakistan
stands suspect of providing sustenance and support to an array of terrorist
groups, and, thus, remains virtually under the shadow of being declared a
terrorist state. Pakistan has to either tame the tiger that it has created,
or give up all its objectives in Afghanistan. On the ground this means that
Pakistan has to win-and quickly-so that the Taliban can lay claim to the UN
seat, and the stability that is assumed to go along with it. If it does not
do so, then it must consider the alternatives.
This paper traces Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in the period after
Kargil, when the focus of international attention on the region was
sharpened in the wake of the hijacking of an Indian Airlines aircraft, the
sacking of a prime minister, and the ambitions of a military that appears
to realise that this could very well be its last chance at ruling the
country. This period is also evocative of the pulls and pressures within
Pakistan, and indeed-as mentioned at the beginning of this paper-provides a
brief on Pakistan itself during an important phase of its history.
For the sake of cogent analysis, the paper begins with a summary of what
Pakistan's objectives were to begin with in launching the Taliban. This is
followed by a brief review of Pakistan-Taliban relations in the first phase
(November 1994-June 1999), with the objective of getting an answer to two
crucial and interrelated questions: Has Pakistan been able to achieve its
objectives in Afghanistan? What are the constraints that apply to a full
realisation of these objectives with regard to the new regime? In the final
analysis, does Pakistan "control" Afghanistan? It must be noted
that
"control" here is taken to mean that the primary actor can
influence the
behaviour and actions of the secondary actor so as to lead to an outcome
that is perceived as being satisfactory to the former and reasonably so to
the latter.
Constants or Add Ons?:
Pakistan's Objectives in Afghanistan
As is now well known, Islamabad began its campaign of covert war in
Afghanistan as early as 1973, when it began to arm and train batches of
30-40 disaffected elements, an operation that was carried out with help
from the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency),1 according to the then governor
of the Frontier Provinces, General Fazle Haq.2 The former governor of the
Frontier Provinces Maj General Nasirullah Babbar also confirms that
Pakistan began training and arming of disaffected Afghans in 1973.3 Between
1973-77, Pakistan trained an estimated 5,000 dissidents and channelled aid
to the Hazaras located in central Afghanistan.4 This programme, started by
Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, was essentially a move against the
regime of Sardar Daud who was a strong proponent of "Pashtunistan"-which
was essentially diplo-speak for Afghan ambitions on what was undoubtedly
Pashtun territory in Pakistan. The operation nearly achieved its aims,
since Kabul is said to have come calling to discuss the possibility of
recognition of the Durand Line.
However, as the Soviets moved in, matters changed completely. The region
was sucked into the vortex of Cold War competition, as American
"aid"-which
started at about $30 million in 1980 and exceeded $ one billion a year by
19895-began to flow into the region. The operation, which was controlled by
the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan, tied in with the
original objectives, as well as appeared to fit in with new ones. The
Pashtun problem was subsumed under the banner of jehad, thus, propagating a
pan-Islamic identity rather than an ethno-nationalist one. At one stroke,
this negated what had till then been Kabul's trump card, and allowed
Islamabad to hunt with the "devil" and run with the hounds. US aid
was,
thus, legitimised in the greater Islamic cause, even as Pakistan was
projected as the courageous adversary against the Reds (the indifference of
the government during the mob attack on the US embassy in November 1979
apparently having been forgotten).
Other objectives in this second phase were important "add ons". The
nuclear
programme initiated under Bhutto was clearly not one that the Americans
would be at all comfortable with. The astute General Zia, therefore,
managed to tie in Pakistan's new found status to the US turning a blind eye
to its activities in this field. Moreover, a considerable amount of
military equipment began to arrive for the courageous ally, all of which
was supposed to protect it from the might of the Soviets. Aircraft, guns
and tanks flowed into the armouries of Pakistan, even as the ISI was
presented with the greatest gift of all-an unprecedented supply of light
weapons, finance (in the form of drugs money) and no accountability. In the
evocative words of a Pakistani intelligence officer. "We could have
conducted operations on Mars."6
The third phase began in 1992 with the withdrawal of the superpowers, and
the unexpected resilience of the Najibullah regime. The equally unexpected
disappearance of the Soviet Union led to an expansion of Pakistan's aims.
If the nominally Islamic regimes of Central Asia could be brought under the
Pakistani fold (especially since it offered the nearest outlet to the sea
that was not actively opposed by the US) this would mean an end to
Pakistan's "South Asia-minimal power" status, and the emergence of
Pakistan
as "a pillar of the Muslim world."
However, by 1994, even existing trade between the Central Asian Republics
(CARs) and Pakistan had stopped due to the chaos of infighting in
Afghanistan. The truckers mafia controlled by the Pashtuns (who had
enriched themselves considerably during the massive covert operation) began
to pressure their own "man" in upper circles-the interior minister
and
former trouble shooter for Afghanistan, General (retd.) Nasirullah Babbar.
Within Pakistan itself, Benazir Bhutto was trying to wrest the control of
state policy, including foreign policy, from the ISI.
Thus, it was that the Taliban-groups of religious students who had indeed
been operating even during the time of the jehad-were brought under the
wing of the Interior Ministry, a fact that is now openly admitted by the
general himself.7 And, thus, was born the force that was in a completely
different operation than had been done before. This was so open as to mock
the tag of "covert" assistance, so large as to make it a near
"bottom up"
exercise, and so extensive that it was difficult to think of one area where
that force could manage on its own.
As observers note, everything from the tin plates for the rucksacks to the
communications lines were Pakistani delivered. Thus, the objective now was
the sustenance and creation of an army that was well equipped, and that was
to be simply an extension of the Pakistan Army in all but name. (That the
US had a fair-but unknown-share in the equipping of this army meant that
some of the benefits would have to be shared with the US.)
Thus, it was that following an extensive review of army doctrine which led
to the propagation of the doctrine of "offensive defence" (and the
use of
the Mujahideen during the exercise which preceded it), General Aslam Beg
was heard to say that "Afghanistan and Pakistan were two countries but
one
people.and any future war will be our war, which gives the Pakistan army
added capability".8 This perception was outlined in an article in a
prominent defence journal which noted that the inclusion of the 500,000
battle-trained Mujahideen to the 500,000-strong Pakistan Army would forever
change the balance of power on the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent.9 This
emerged as the last point (so far) of the evolution of Pakistani policy and
objectives towards Afghanistan. Thus, what started as a "border
conflict",
escalated into an objective of controlling an entire country as well as
using it to further irredentist claims elsewhere.
The Taliban Today
However, all of this assumed that the "Taliban" would remain a
fairly
disciplined body that would prove amenable to Pakistani prodding, and
grateful for assistance. Indeed, there was every reason to suppose that
this prodding would succeed, given that Pakistani "assistance" was
complete
in certain crucial areas:
Additionally, it was the Pakistani knowledge (and leverage) with different
commanders that "persuaded" them (either with money or the promise
of a
quick demise) to join up with the Taliban-which did much to propagate the
false idea that this was a "social" movement rather than a propped
up
Kandahari clique.
Pakistani assistance at crucial points-like during the fall of
Kandahar-emerged as a critical factor. When this was not present, the
Taliban forays tended to be rather unsuccessful, revealing a poor knowledge
of conventional battle (which is usually anathema to the average Pashtun).
At a later date, Pakistani assistance to an extent was also able to hold
together the Taliban "forces" which displayed a tendency to drift
away once
their own areas had been cleaned up. The input of continuous recruitment
from the Pakistani side was, therefore, crucial. In addition to this were
the following areas of assistance which tied Afghanistan with an umbilical
cord of considerable strength to the Pakistani economy and politics:
But this kind of intense Pakistani linkage was bound to affect the
evolution of the Taliban itself. What started out as a genuinely local and
highly ideologically orientated group has today become something of a mixed
bunch. While the top echelons around Mullah Omar to an extent continue
along the same lines, the motivations of the rest are naturally affected by
the opportunities offered by their linkages across the border, and their
own persuasions.
Some points need to be noted here regarding the creation of the Taliban.
Pakistan and the Taliban-Post-Kargil
By mid-1999, extensive reports of the Pakistani involvement in the Kargil
conflict, as well as the Pakistani nexus with terrorism in Afghanistan at
almost every level made prominent stories. News analysis underlined the
Harkat-ul-Ansar's nodal role in allotting trainees to their different
sectors and their importance in running the training camps. Reports noted
that more than 8,000 Pakistanis were in the Taliban ranks with a diplomat
quoted as saying, "The state is privatising war to advance its own
goals".11
Photographs of Pakistani prisoners of war only added to this
impression. In July 1999, the UN envoy for Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahmi, was
noting the involvement of Pakistani youth in what was essentially a local
war. He noted, "They call it jehad. Nobody else does".12
The US ambassador to Pakistan had taken the somewhat unprecedented step in
May 1999 to publicly caution Pakistan that it risked antagonising the US if
it continued to pursue its pro-Taliban policy. Policy circles in Pakistan
saw this as additional pressure on Pakistan to use its influence on the
Taliban. Indeed, the ambassador said as much, claiming that Pakistan was
assisting the Taliban in "different fields".13 In August, exactly a
year
after the east African bombing of US embassies, rumours were rife that the
US was moving in special forces to capture Bin Laden. This set the cat
among the pigeons.
The rumour was given credence by Qatari TV which announced that two US
military aircraft had landed at airports in Pakistan and commandos had
taken up positions around the field.14 This led to a clarion call from
Mullah Omar for "all Muslim states to stand by Afghanistan" and an
outpouring of venom from extremist parties within Pakistan. The relatively
moderate Jamaat-e-Islami-perhaps in a venture to appear even more
revolutionary than the rest-joined issue with the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam
(JUI) (Fazlur) which had already been threatening Washington with a hit
"within 8 hours"15 of any act against Osama Bin Laden while the JUI
(Samiul
Haque) was equally graphic in its threats.
Miranshah, Waziristan and other
Pashtun tribal areas appeared to be up in arms against possible US action.
This was followed by a massive exodus of Afghan youths (mostly under 17)
from the madrassas of Pakistan. Reports from Pakistan noted that
"thousands" of youths were enrolling in the Taliban ranks. Indeed,
large
madrassas like the Darul Uloom Haqqania (Akora Khattak) remained shut for
10 days in response to the message from the Taliban leader.16 This was
confirmed by the Taliban spokesman who noted that the students included
both Pakistanis and Afghans sent to study in the seminaries.17 Clearly
matters appeared to be coming to a head.
Meanwhile "consultations" were on, with Pakistan sponsoring talks
at
Dushanbe, with a contingent led interestingly by Interior Ministry
officials.18 This was apparently aimed at power sharing arrangements with
the Opposition but ended with the latter refusing to discuss a settlement
till Pakistan stopped supporting the Taliban. Commander Masood was heard to
note that over 1,000 Pakistani officers were present in Kabul to advise and
assist the Taliban.19 The Taliban in its turn accused the Opposition forces
of liaising with the Israelis, an accusation that seems to have been aimed
at ending Iranian support for the group.20
In Parliament, enraged senators-stung after the defeat at Kargil and using
it as a bludgeon against the ruling party-were ironically warning that this
constituted a "naked intervention" in the affairs of a neighbouring
country.21 Across Pakistan, there was a rash of sectarian terrorist attacks
(13 sectarian incidents in 10 days) adding fuel to the perceived threat
from the "Talibanisation" and the spread of weapons from the war
next door.
Within the government, tensions were high enough to be palpable. The
post-Kargil rift between the inner decision-makers and the army was again
apparent. In September 1999, a rather unusual number of persons were
hurrying to Washington. One was Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif, and
the other was the Director General (DG) of the ISI, Lt General Ziauddin.
Prominent papers speculated on these sudden visits, especially since the
army chief had yet to make a visit (General Musharraf-unlike most of his
fellow officers-has had no training/courses in the US at all). Sharif is
said to have met Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, and Assistant
Secretary of State for South Asia Karl Inderfurth among others. An
in-camera meeting of the Cabinet (minus the military secretary) furthered
rumours. Meanwhile, the visit of the ISI chief was declared as "routine
consultations"22 though other reports noted that the DG was asked for a
briefing in response to a fear of a "Talibanisation of a nuclear armed
Pakistan".
Reliable reports from Pakistan noted that the US had warned the Pakistanis
about a possible "international reaction" to Pakistan's failure to
prevent
patronage of terrorism. The threat of placing Pakistan under the State
Department's list of terrorist states was reportedly held out.23 Side by
side, it was known that the US was piloting a proposal at the UN Security
Council for sanctions against the Taliban.
Many of these stories were confirmed when the DG-ISI visited Kabul with the
"request" that the Taliban shut down terrorist training camps in
Afghanistan. This reportedly led to an impasse with the army which had
always controlled Afghan operations-though this was done through the front
of the ISI. The Army Chief General Musharraf-who had taken the precaution
of appointing his loyalists like General Mahmud Aziz as deputy chief of the
ISI and packed other posts with his own men-ordered that all matters
concerning Afghanistan would be shifted to the chief of General Staff's
office. This was an absolute challenge to the political brass, who were not
slow in responding.
In October 1999, the prime minister himself made the startling announcement
that he had asked the supreme leader of the Taliban to shut down the
terrorist camps.24 This charge was, according to him, made on
"solid"
evidence that had been put together for him by the intelligence agencies.
As a daily observed, "Who on earth can believe that it was only last
week
that Islamabad came to know about Pakistanis given military training?"25
The overwhelming opinion was that this was a signal to official agencies to
delink themselves from all militant groups-at least those under US
scrutiny. But curiously, it was also noted that this "paradigm
shift" had
not even been discussed in the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) nor
was the army given a perspective over the warnings from the US.26
The prime minister's blunt message was hastily reworked by the Foreign
Ministry which noted that the Taliban was helping Pakistan to deal with the
problem, and that while Afghanistan was indeed a base, the Taliban was
hardly involved.27 Sartaj Aziz noted that the Taliban's "help" was
solicited, and this was hardly an unprecedented step. He claimed that the
Taliban was not in control of the whole of Afghanistan, and indeed Pakistan
"was not concerned whether or not people get training in Afghanistan.
But
when it comes to Pakistan, it becomes a key issue."28 To buttress this,
the
administration launched an anti-sectarian sweep in which over 100 men of
the extremist Sipah-e-Sahaba were arrested.
The Taliban leadership reacted to this volte face, by noting that a clear
distinction be made between terrorists and freedom fighters29 (a point of
view that was to have a significant impact on the following government).
One observer noted presciently".the government is currently trapped
between
a rock and a hard place. In any case it will lose."30
The backlash from the Islamists was that the Nawaz "discovery" of
Pakistanis being trained in Afghanistan was simply paving the way for US
action, while news analysts were also wondering at this paradigm shift in
Pakistan-Afghanistan relations, and the possible motivations for such a
swift change. In Afghanistan, the threat had some curious effects. Mullah
Omar announced that Afghanistan was ready to talk on terrorism to anyone in
the world. Alongside this, however, he ordered a massive reshuffle in the
Taliban administration. Some of the changes made are worthy of note here.
Mullah Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil was elevated from the post of spokesman to that of foreign minister. An old guard Taliban like Mullah Khairkhawa was shifted out from the post of interior minister to governor of Herat, as well as the Helmand areas. Mullah Akunzada (once a powerful force in Helmand in the pre-Taliban days, and linked closely with the Pakistani elite) was made corps commander, Kabul. Mullah "Rocketi", known to have been responsible for the kidnapping of Chinese engineers, and an arms dealer for the Taliban, was moved from the sensitive Jalalabad area to the western frontier. Essentially this saw a shift of power to the core Taliban, while those with close connections to the Pakistani institutions or other circles were moved out of the areas near the Pakistani border.31 This appeared to be in reaction to reports that Pakistani contingents, with CIA assistance, were moving to attack Afghan camps. On October 10, 1999, reports appeared of these groups, put at around 30-50 each, moving out from Torkham and Chaman.32
This was apparently "confirmed" by
bureaucrats, but
there was no independent assessment nor indeed any further news of these
commando raids. Whether they existed at all is open to some doubt. But the
Afghan side obviously felt it was serious enough to quickly upgrade
security at sensitive camps. Clearly, there was a rift between Islamabad
and Kabul-real or simply created for the moment-with the former fearing air
strikes, and the latter doing everything it could to fuel the stories in
the Press of a "turnaround" in Pakistani policy.
On October 12, another incident highlighted the flux within the
relationship. Mullah Omar was targetted in a truck bombing which narrowly
missed killing him though it did hit several senior commanders. Oddly
enough, the chief made haste to note that the USA was "not
involved"-a
statement that led to renewed suspicions that at least some sections of the
US Administration still had "connections" with the Taliban.
On October 12, 1999, the army took over power.
The Taliban and the New Regime
Ironically, the man who had planned Kargil and headed an institution that
incorporated the use of jehadi irregulars as part and parcel of its
strategy33 was initially seen as a "moderate" element who would
prove to be
more harsh on the Taliban extremist policies. Few cared to remember that
the general had once been closely working with Bin Laden himself during the
Afghan operations, and had used the group to quell a Shia uprising in
Gilgit.34 However, to his credit, the general, while unorthdox in his
methods, was apparently motivated by realpolitik rather than religion. In
January 1999, he was heard to warn of internal dangers to Pakistan being at
the forefront while he pointed to the "zero" possibility of war
with
India35 even as preparations for just such a war had been set afoot.
Realpolitik, therefore, demanded that Pakistan do a little shifting and
changing in its policy towards Kabul-even as the objectives were kept
intact. Thus, General Musharraf appeared to have soothed the fears of the
US ambassador when he called for a representative government in Kabul and
indeed showed all initial signs of sweeping with a new broom in the
country's foreign policy.
Meanwhile, the UNSC (United Nations Security Council) passed the resolution
to impose limited sanctions on the Taliban (October 15) but which was due
to go into effect as of November 14, 1999. Acting under Chapter VII of the
Charter of the UN, the Security Council determined that the Taliban's
failure to respond to demands to stop terrorism36 constituted a threat to
international peace and security. The crucial clauses were that the Taliban
give up shelter to, and training of, international terrorists, and use of
the territory "under its control" for terrorist installations and
camps, or
for the preparation or organisation of terrorist acts against other states
or their citizens. Another clause specifically demanded the handing over of
Osama bin Laden to "appropriate authorities" who would bring him to
justice.37
The next move of the new government appeared to contradict its stated
posture. It ordered the release of goods imported under the ATTA-a huge
source of smuggling for the Taliban and the Pakistani transborder mafia-and
additionally was reported to have waived Rs 8 billion worth of excise duty
on these goods.38 Considering that Pakistan has been extremely shrill on
the ramifications of the ATTA trade and the huge losses in revenue to the
staggering economy, this was a surprising development.
A few days later, the new administration was faced with yet another crisis.
Just two days before the UN sanctions were to take effect, a series of
seven rockets were fired at the US embassy, UN building, American cultural
centre and downtown government buildings, wounding at least six people. All
seven attacks appeared to have occurred within a two-minute time span, and
were fired from cars parked in the vicinity.39 Representative Frank Pallone
blamed Pakistan and its unstinting support for the Taliban,40 but the
attackers themselves remained unidentified. Former chief of the ISI Javed
Nasir, accused the Masood faction of perpetrating the blasts,41 while
others pointed a finger at the Taliban, since it was they who had been
"warning" against the imposition of sanctions. Mullah Omar himself
condemned the blasts as "unIslamic"-which was at one with his
earlier
hair-splitting on what constituted terrorism and what constituted violence
permitted by jehad.
With the sanctions coming into effect, Iran moved to open borders with the
Taliban (at Islam Quilla), indicating its contempt for what was seen as
US-sponsored sanctions, as well as its decision to keep the doors open to
talks with the Taliban. Moves were also made to reopen the consulate-a move
that was viewed with concern in Pakistani intelligence circles. Iran
followed this up with two simultaneous conferences in Rome and Iran, which
propagated the return of Zahir Shah and the calling of a loya jirga.
The sanctions themselves were, however, rather a sham. They required
Pakistan-and other neighbours-to cut off diplomatic relations with
Afghanistan, as well as all funds by "their nationals, or by any persons
within their territory, to or for the benefit of the Taliban or any
undertaking, owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Taliban."
As a former president of the Quetta Chamber of Commerce noted, the
Taliban-or those who lived within those territories-hardly had any need for
banking facilities, since all transactions were made in cash. Besides, all
large deals were made in Pakistani rupees.42 The sanctions apparently
helped boost the profits of the smugglers, and encourage the existing
cross-border illegal trade to a considerable degree. This was apparent as
an acute flour crisis deepened in the Frontier regions, and observers
pointed out that this was due to the complicity of border officials with
smugglers.43 The importance of the illicit trade in post-Taliban
Afghanistan is underlined by Ahmed Rashid who notes that this rose from a
mere $128 million in 1992-93 to a staggering $2.5 billion in 1997, which is
more than half of Afghanistan's estimated gross domestic product (GDP).
When the income from narcotics smuggling is added, this, according to
Rashid, should amount to $5 billion.44 Thus, it was hardly surprising that
the UN sought a report from Pakistan on the steps taken by it to impose
sanctions.
Meanwhile, the Taliban responded by opening yet another border post (Nawa
Pass) to apparently facilitate the crossing of relatives and others.
However, Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar announced that all Taliban accounts
had been frozen and that Pakistan would respect the sanctions. How this
would affect the reported $2.5 billion illegal trade with Afghanistan, and
the supply of all essential commodities and services (including electricity
and communications) remained unclear.
Meanwhile, the administration sent home some 120,000 Afghan refugees, even
as it sought "world neutrality" on Afghanistan. Speaking at the UN,
Pakistan's ambassador noted that it was unproductive to demonise one side,
and backed the six-plus-two initiatives as the only way out of the
conflict.45 This statement appeared to be in reaction to a report by UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan that castigated the Taliban's dismal human
rights record, the increasing terrorising of the population, as well as the
growing presence of thousands of young volunteers-some children under the
age of 14-from religious schools in Pakistan.46
The hijacking of the Indian Airlines flight from Nepal to Kandahar appeared
to underline the role of the Pakistani connection. Indian decision-makers
noted that radio intercepts between the hijackers and their contacts in
Pakistan, and the later disappearance of the hijackers into Pakistan
underlined the thesis. The Taliban's attitude was, however, more mixed. On
the one hand, they offered cooperation on the issue, but, on the other,
they effectively prevented any commando action by the Indians.
Analysts
noted that both the Indian negotiators and the hijackers had been
pressurised by the Taliban,47 indicating a savvy and confident negotiating
stance from the Taliban. This was further apparent as Taliban fighters
simply lounged around the aircraft and drank tea, and to all appearances
seemed content to sense no threat to anyone. The only jolt to this was the
unexpected demand for a ransom of $200 million by the hijackers. This was
one demand that was not only negotiable but might have been accepted by the
Indians, especially since it clearly exposed the motivations of the
"freedom fighters". Islamist groups as well as Taliban spokesmen
noted that
they were "stunned" by the demand, since this would make the
hijackers lose
whatever sympathy they might have gained.48 As it happened, this demand was
denounced as "unIslamic" (condoning apparently the seizure of
innocents as
Islamic) before New Delhi could react, raising suspicions that the
"cooperation" hid ulterior motives. Other sources like the
Washington Post
also noted, "Afghanistan and Pakistan are trying to have it both ways on
terrorism. They play host to terrorist groups yet wax indignant when
terrorists hijack an aircraft or.blow up US embassies."49
International Reactions:
The Pace Hots Up
A surprising event thereafter underlined the slowly building consensus
among neighbours that Pakistan needed to rein in terrorism. China,
long-time friend and nuclear ally, for the first time lodged a protest with
Pakistan, noting the training that was being given to terrorists on its
soil. This evidence had been unearthed after the arrest of 16 Shia Muslims
in China. For the first time, China also noted the existence of 1,600
active members of the "Party of Allah" which was said to use heroin
for
funding terrorism.50 Noticeably, after pleading the porosity of Pakistan's
border in regard to the entry of the hijackers, Pakistan was able to do a
thorough search and "credibly" inform China that there was no
evidence of
any such movement or camps in any part of the tribal areas.
On January 16, 2000, the Taliban announced the formal recognition of
Chechnya51-a statement that led to a Russian outcry not only against the
Taliban but also against Pakistan for its failure to prevent such an
outcome. Russia's ire increased as former President of Chechnya Zelim Khan
was accorded a huge welcome in Pakistan from the Islamists, even as he
appears to have met all the leading policy-makers.52 Following the
imposition of sanctions, Russia also noted that over 100 trucks had crossed
over from Pakistan with ammunition and weapons for the Taliban units for
the spring offensive.53
A curious report at the tail end of the hijacking noted that Saudi Arabia
had expressed annoyance that "scores of Arab militants" had been
flown out
of Peshawar around December 29, 1999, and were sent to Saudi Arabia,
according to an Interior Ministry source. These men apparently had fake
Afghan passports and had dispersed for unknown reasons.54 Yet another
source noted that Egyptian terrorists were carrying fake Pakistani
passports.55 Most telling of an apparent "isolation" of Pakistan
was the
refusal of the Turkish prime minister to visit Pakistan, lambasting the
supporters of the Taliban, even as he made a trip to India.
Prior to the visit of the US president, there was a spate of reports from
the US which specifically charged Osama Bin Laden and the Harkat-ul-Ansar
with supporting the terrorist groups in Kashmir.
However, M.R. Sheehan, the
chief coordinator on anti-terrorism also noted that the Taliban fondly
remembered US assistance in their freedom struggle, "I also believe that
they do not want individuals or organisations to plan and conduct terrorist
operations from their soil."56 This obviously meant that other powers or
individuals were using Afghan territory for their own ends.
Back in Pakistan, Masood Azhar, the militant freed by New Delhi in the
hijack incident-after a few days in "protective custody"-was
received with
fanfare at Banuri Masjid in Karachi. This is one of the many large
seminaries that are often overlooked, and it remains one of the largest
seminaries of "revolutionary" Deobandi activity, and the main
sponsor of
Harkat activity, according to Pakistani sources.57 The announcement of the
formation of a new party, the "Jaish Mohammad" was made under the
aegis of
this seminary, led by Mufti Shamzai.58 The mufti is understood to be
closely linked to Mullah Omar, and is respected by the various tiers of
Taliban leadership. The subsequent declaration of a jehad against the US
and India59 only served to confirm India's contention that the
"religious
scholar" was far from being simply an ideologue.
Plea of Talibanisation
Meanwhile, continuing evidence of Pakistanis being trained in Afghanistan
(Isphol camp), with the Harkat ul-Ansar evidently involved at all stages,
came to light even as reports of a group leaving for Chechnya surfaced in
the Press. Other reports noted that Pakistan had the largest private army
of Islamists,60 while yet others noted the "Afghan connection" to
Islamic
extremism-in particular the activities of the Harkat-ul-Ansar with its
training camps in Afghanistan-with the Rishkor camp reportedly
"supervised"
by the dreaded Pakistani terrorist Riaz Basra (an ex-Mujahideen) and those
in Pakistan itself on the Muzzafarabad road, and other areas of POK.61 The
trend of these various articles was unmistakable-that the powerful Islamist
lobby was slowly trying to seize political power, assisted by a well-armed
and trained army. This was the essence of the warning of
"Talibanisation"
of Pakistan, where the onus was on Kabul for unleashing violent
sectarianism on Pakistan. This tied in with the projection of the new
regime as one that was against such activities and which condemned
"terrorism" even while it supported self-determination. Such ideas
were
furthered when Qazi Hussain obligingly noted in London that were it not for
the army, the Islamists would have been able to seize power.62
That this
was completely negated by the admission of prominent jehadis-who should
certainly be in the know-was not generally observed. The leader of the
Lashkar-e-Taiba and others were heard to say that Nawaz Sharif's last days
had proved to be tough, and that the army's return was, quite literally, an
answer to their prayers.63 In fact, he noted that the coming of the army
had led to the release of several jailed jehadis who had been imprisoned
during the latter period of the Sharif government.
This kind of twin-track policy was apparent in the period prior to the
Clinton visit. On the one hand, efforts were made to convince the media and
the international community that Pakistan was indeed for taking action
against terrorists for the sake of its own security, even as the same
jehadi policy that encouraged terrorists in the first place was hardly
touched. In fact, the focus of attention was kept continuously on
Afghanistan, and the issue of "terrorism" that emanated from there.
Following a further protest by China, General Musharraf announced a
surprise visit to Kabul and his decision to talk turkey to Mullah Omar. But
this proactive policy has remained on paper as of the time of writing, and
the general remained in Pakistan. At another level, a whirl of activity was
apparent, with various Arabs being arrested with much fanfare on charges of
being suspected Bin Laden aides-and more often than not released later. For
instance, the announcement of the arrest of an Egyptian "aide" with
over
$35,000 and forged passports in his possession was subsequently found to be
false.64
Similarly, while Musharraf was reported to have asked a Rabbani-led team in
February 2000 to resolve the Osama issue and form a broad based
government,65 on the other hand, arms were pouring into Afghanistan from
all sides in preparation for an offensive which began with a bloody opening
by the Taliban. However, it appeared that strong ISI contingents were not
present this time around, nor was there adequate intelligence at the
tactical level-an asset that has been invaluable to the Taliban. The ISI,
however, appeared to be busy in Pakistan itself, where a series of murders
of moderate leaders ensured that no others emerged to challenge the
Taliban.66
In the same vein, Foreign Minister Sattar came out strongly against
terrorism that emanated from Afghanistan, even as diplomatic moves went on
at a frenetic pace to gain acceptability for the Taliban. After
consistently refusing to attend (unless recognition was forthcoming), the
Taliban was persuaded to take part in Organisation of Islamic Countries
(OIC) sponsored talks in Saudi Arabia. This volte face was obviously aimed
at breaking out of the isolation that was beginning to take a toll on
Pakistan itself. Sattar also, however, differentiated between terrorism and
militancy, noting that militancy was not a crime unless "a person
commits
an act of terrorism or uses force against an innocent person."67 Right
on
cue, the targetting policy in Kashmir shifted-with the now heavily foreign
dominated jehadi parties targetting the Indian armed forces rather than the
beleaguered people. This marked a significant shift in the history of
terrorism in the subcontinent.
The Clinton visit itself was seen in diverse ways by different groups with
one insisting that Pakistan had received "a slap in the face",
while others
crowed that it was a loss of face for Indian diplomacy. While the US
president-or rather his entourage-made it obvious that the visit was hardly
an "endorsement" of the Musharraf regime and the hijacking of
democracy,
and that the US was unhappy with Islamabad's record of supporting
terrorism, there was also a clear decision not to push Pakistan too far on
either issue. General Musharraf, in turn, reiterated his concerns on
Kashmir, and publicly announced that there were "differences" over
the
handling of the Taliban issue. A prominent commentator, however, noted that
Pakistan "has to deliver, and terrorism holds the key".68
This appeared to be sage advice. Subsequently, the interior minister was
quoted by Businessweek as saying that he would tell the Taliban that
harbouring Osama was not "worth the price it is paying" in
diplomatic and
economic isolation. The magazine also quoted Pakistani officials as saying
that the bulk of US-Pakistani discussions during the Clinton visit had
focussed on counter-terrorism. The fact that the minister, during his visit
to Washington, was accompanied by the new ISI chief and Musharraf loyalist
General Mahmud was seen as heralding a new agenda. Back in Islamabad,
Interior Minister Moinuddin Haider asked Afghanistan to close down all
terrorist camps, and extradite sectarian extremists. A clear threat from
the minister that the sectarian parties would have to stop or else "we
will
get them by the neck" appeared to be real enough, as the government
continued this by passing strict arms control laws, and weapons collection
measures.
The response to this was rather baffling. The Taliban was said to have
asked Pakistani groups to close down a string of small camps near
Jalalabad, Paktia, Khost and other parts-but reportedly allowed them to
relocate to a bigger facility-all this without any outcry from Pakistan.
The main camps at Rishkor continued to function, while those within
Pakistan were not disturbed at all. The media found these moves equally
puzzling. As the courageous Newsline noted,69 on the one hand, Pakistan was
apparently concerned about terrorism, while on the other, it did nothing at
all to prevent the grand conferences of Maulana Azhar which received
considerable publicity-this at a time when the US was specifically asking
Pakistan to close down terrorist camps. The argument from the interior
minister and the Harkat chief was as before-that terrorism could not be
equated with militancy and a freedom struggle.70 Given this interpretation,
the Afghan foreign minister was not far off the mark when he said that
there were no terrorist camps in his country.
Conclusion
In evaluating Pakistani policy towards Afghanistan, the first question that naturally arises is whether Pakistan has been able to achieve its objectives in Afghanistan and if so at what cost? This would be a barometer of the options before Chief Executive Officer (CEO) General Musharraf and also the possible future options open to Islamabad. Here it is worth reiterating the main objectives of Pakistan:
Regarding the first objective, it is difficult to envisage a friendlier
regime to Pakistan than the Taliban. Ideologically, politically and
functionally, it remains almost a part of Pakistan itself. As long as the
Taliban continues in its present form, this will carry on with some
variations, depending on personal and institutional equations.
The second objective is much more difficult. At present, it is vital that
the Taliban controls the whole of Afghanistan. This is not just to
consolidate the hold of the group, but also to prevent the reemergence of
Pashtun nationalism that could so easily become the country's worst
nightmare. The virtual disappearance of the Durand Line, the
"tying" of
Taliban infrastructure into Pakistan's border areas, especially Peshawar
and its environs, and most of all the so-called "Talibanisation" of
these
bordering areas all point to danger signals of a Taliban that may settle
down to an exclusively Pashtun identity. General Musharraf's call for a
broad based government-which would naturally see a heavy presence of the
Taliban rather than any real power sharing-should be seen in this light.
The third objective remains as yet elusive, though is likely to emerge in
the near future. Trade with Central Asia already exists, but this cannot be
exploited to the full till peace returns. Moreover, the crux of the trade
comprises the offering of an exit route for Central Asian oil and gas, and
there is as yet no movement in this direction.
The image of a moderate state that engages with the Taliban and against
"fundamentalism" was one that Benazir Bhutto had tried hard to
project. As
noted above, this image has taken a beating, and recent visits of the CEO
to Egypt and Indonesia show that this state of affairs continues.
The last objective has to an extent been successfully achieved. The
presence of thousands of jehadis gives the Pakistan Army a deniable and
extremely cheap source of power projection. As scholars have noted,71 the
use of irregulars in the Pakistan Army has been consistent, and at present
is unlikely to be given up-unless Pakistan decides to completely overturn
its long-time strategy in both Afghanistan and Kashmir. In fact, so
important is this policy to the Pakistani elite, that it was in part
responsible for the imprisonment of a prime minister who was alleged to
have tried to distance Pakistan from the Taliban,72 and from the jehad into
Kashmir as well.
The Costs:
Talibanisation This is directly related to the perceived threat of Talibanisation that is seen to be the one of the main costs that Pakistan has had to bear. Here it is worth viewing "Talibanisation" in its proper perspective. The Taliban movement is essentially a national one, though its professed ideology-what there is of it-aims at sheltering and providing sustenance to Muslims everywhere. In reality, the Taliban is pretty much engaged in stabilising its own land rather than fighting elsewhere.
Thus, Taliban leaders have indignantly denied that any of their cadres were present in Kargil-a fact which cannot be completely refuted. Neither are there any "Taliban" in Central Asia or anywhere else, though the ideology is undeniably one that is being used by a wide variety of actors, including drugs traffickers who support "fundamentalist" groups for their own ends. This ideology is also being used by the Pakistan Army to attain its objective against India, and justify its "moral" intervention in Kashmir.
Therefore, much of the
"Talibanisation" is by the Pakistanis themselves due to policies
followed
by successive governments in both appeasing the radicals, and pursuing a
foreign policy that is based solely on the waging of jehad (which is
Paki-speak for covert war). This explains why Pakistan is the worst hit in
seeing this phenomenon of the energising of the religious right. Thus,
"Talibanisation" is a Pakistani creation, just as the Taliban
itself was a
Pakistani creation. In short, Pakistan has to first put its own house in
order, and change the way it wants to deal with its neighbours. The Taliban
has little to do with it.
Yet US decision-makers-who should know better-decided to adopt the
"danger
of Talibanisation" line. In January 2000, Deputy Secretary Strobe
Talbott
and Under Secretary Karl Inderfurth were warning of
"Talibanisation",
noting that "with the emergence of the Taliban, there is growing reason
to
fear that militant extremism, obscurantism, and sectarian will affect
surrounding countries". Interestingly, however, other sources also
noted-in
line with later US pronouncements-that there were "wheels within
wheels.which continued to have truck with Osama, besides rendering valuable
material support to the Taliban." Other sources were quoted as saying,
"There is a vast network in your (Pakistani) intelligence community
which
does not listen to any government and which operates on its own. It is
definitely happening in the case of the Taliban and Osama as well..."73
Later, after the massacre of Sikhs in Kashmir, President Clinton echoed the
same perceptions when he noted that "elements" in the Pakistani
government
were backing the violence in Kashmir.74
The Costs: Runaway "Elements"?
While at one point there was a period when the ISI was almost a
free-wheeling body that dominated all other like institutions, today it
appears to be under the firm control of the CEO or his loyalists. However,
it is true that many within the army and its intelligence arm have grown to
like the vast power that covert war brings. The huge apparatus that sends
war material to the front, the internal power that arises from the
influencing of the Islamists and their private armies, the financial power
that comes with drugs trafficking, the institutional power that arises from
the coming together of all these factors-all these are not easily given up.
The greater danger to Pakistan, and indeed to the region, is the
privatisation of the covert war by the most powerful institution in the
country-the Pakistan Army. This at one stroke provides the greatest
resistance to peace initiatives from any side, and the single element that
provides the impetus to continuing instability.
The Future:
Dealing with the Taliban
As noted above, the CEO is under pressure-both from factors within and
without-to rein in and close once and for all the Taliban adventure. The
need to bring the war to an end on Pakistan's terms has already been
discussed. However, pending that, the question of "influencing" the
Taliban, and stemming the rot within his own country remains.
This raises the question of what influence can be brought to bear. This
paper referred to the roots of the Taliban, and its present structure which
is divided into many layers, each with its own motivations. Within this, as
noted, there are groups that are closely allied to Pakistani groups, as
well as institutions. Thus, these groups/institutions can play a
considerable part in influencing the direction of Taliban policy. Nearly
all of these groups/institutions-the transport mafia, the drugs mafia, and
the Islamists-once functioned under the patronage of the military during
the long years of Soviet occupation. Today, each has a measure of
independence, yet all have to play the game under the rules drawn up by the
military or its institutions.
At a more prosaic and easily understood level, it may be argued that the
intelligence has only to cut off weapons aid to bring the Taliban offensive
to a grinding halt. So the fact remains that there are many strings
Islamabad can pull to ensure that the Taliban continue to heed its
"advice".
But here Pakistani policy is somewhat in a bind. Pakistani policy presumes
that if Islamabad cuts off aid, other neighbours like Iran would be only
too happy to oblige. At one level, while it is true that the Taliban-due to
its ties, bonding and the past-follows the dictates of Pakistani agencies,
it is bound to become adept at avoiding a degree of vulnerability by
turning ostentatiously-as it did in early 2000-to other sources of
sustenance. At another level, Iranian or other assistance would in the end
mean the virtual "disinventing" of the Taliban in its present form,
which
means twenty years of Pakistani effort going down the drain. This is the
Pakistan fear.
But there is an important caveat: while outside sources may offer some
help, few-and certainly not Central Asia or Iran-can afford to prop up
virtually an entire country and feed a dangerously indisciplined "armed
force" for even a few years. Neither can Pakistan-which means that
Islamabad and the Taliban are still getting their "aid" from
diverse
sources. The French believe that the US still has a hand here, while the
Saudis continue to play the "front office".
There is an other important caveat here. Note that the US evinces no
particular enmity towards the Taliban and never has. It was one of the
first countries to move towards an implicit endorsement of the regime, and
at present continues to have channels of communication with it. What it
objects to are the sheltering of Osama and the terrorist camps that
function under some "outside" control.
Dealing with Terrorist Camps
The question that is of interest, then, is-just who controls the Afghan
terrorist camps? For this, it is necessary to note that many of these camps
date back to the Mujahideen days, when they were used as bases to launch
attacks. In the initial years especially, the main training camps were in
Pakistan, not in Afghanistan. By the mid-1990s, however, as US policy
veered towards serious counter-terrorism, and the emergence of various
terrorists-like Ramzi Youseff of the World Trade Centre bombing and Aimal
Kansi who killed the CIA officers at Langley-from Pakistani territory
persuaded Pakistan to move many of these camps to just across the border. Control remained in the hands of the ISI as well as sections within the
Frontier Corps.
After 1993-94, therefore, the running of these groups like the
Harkat-ul-Ansar, Lashkar-e-Taiba and others, was handed over to the large
seminaries-which being inside Pakistan were within the control of the
state. These large outfits owe their land, patronage and power-and, more
importantly, their weapons-either directly to the state or to state
indulgence. Recall that the land at Muridke was donated by General Zia,
that the JUI (Fazlur) received considerable land and money from Benazir
Bhutto, and that the annual conventions of the Markaz Da'wat ul Ershad were
regularly attended by the prime minister and his entourage. Recall also
that the last Markaz meet was immediately after Kargil-and no impediment of
any kind was put on this meeting by the new army regime. Note also the
relief of the jehadis at the removal of Nawaz Sharif.
Today, the terrorist camps in Afghanistan do produce jehadis for the front.
Where these are Afghans, they usually stay within their own country, or
perish in the war, or return home. A few do move out in search of
profit-but these are the individuals who are affiliated to the
Pakistani-controlled Harkat and others. The largest numbers of terrorists
are Pakistanis, followed by the Arab contingent. They are the jehadis but
at other times they are also the terrorists who feed on Pakistani society
itself. These former fighters stay on to be used as mercenaries by agencies
for their own ends.
Undoubtedly, the camps near Kabul as well as the
"offices" of Uzbek or Tajik resistance are allowed by the
Taliban-which are
reflections of its own interests in dealing with the hostility of these
neighbours (a ploy that has worked by pushing these regimes into opening
"talks" with the Taliban). But the Taliban is not on a "jehadi
spree". As
noted earlier, firstly, it has enough on its plate to keep it occupied, and
secondly, its brand of Pashtun, tribal, and extremist ideology cannot
easily be transplanted to other societies-however "fundamentalist".
The
camps are not vital to Taliban policy-they are, however, completely central
to Pakistani policy.
The bottom line, therefore, appears to be that the thrust of Pakistani
policy in Afghanistan is tied surely to the objectives and nature of not
only the Pakistan government itself, but also the ties within it.
Pakistanis have to learn to change the way they deal with their neighbours,
for as long as covert war continues, the CEO may not be able to control
either his own backyard or the fallout from these adventures. Stability for
the new regime can only flow from its own ability to control institutions
like the intelligence or non-state bodies like the Harkat. The intelligence
draws its power from covert war, as do the Islamist parties and their
creatures who benefit from it. To control Pakistan, General Musharraf has
to do one simple thing-he has to turn off the tap that funds and backs the
jehad policy. Anything else can only be a sop to history. At present that
is all that is visible.
NOTES
1. The involvement of the CIA appears to be supported by the accounts of Zbigniew Brezinski, who as national security advisor was urging more "sympathetic" treatment of the Afghans in early 1980. Zbigniew Brezinzski, Power and Principle (London: Weidenfeld and Goldwin, 1983) p. 420.
2. Robert G. Wirsing, Pakistan's Security Under Zia, 1977-88 (London: Macmillan, 1991) p. 30.
3. Ibid. Also see Christina Lamb, Waiting for Allah (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1991).
4. Edward Girardet, Afghanistan: The Soviet War (New York: St Martin's Press, 1985) p. 166.
5. This figure includes equal infusions of Saudi aid. Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan (Yale University, 1995) p. 30.
6. As noted to Pamela Constable by Deputy Director of the ISI, General Ghulam Ahmed, Washington Post (Washington), February 15, 2000.
7. In September 1998, Nasirullah Babbar was quoted as saying that he had indeed been responsible for patronising the group, The Times of India, September 8, 1998.
8. This is noted by Mushahid Hussain in The Nation, December 17, 1989.
9. Defence Journal, vol. XVI, nos. 4-5, 1990.
10. For a description of Pakistani assistance to the Taliban, see William Maley ed., Fundamentalism Reborn?: Afghanistan and the Taliban (London: Hurst, 1998).
11. Anthony Davis, "One Man's Holy War", Asiaweek, August 6, 1999, p. 22.
12. Lakhdar Brahmi quoted in Dawn, July 31, 1999.
13. He reportedly made these points on a Voice of America broadcast on May 14, The News, May 15, 1999.
14. Qatari TV, Al Jazeerah, quoted by The News, August 10, 1999.
15. Editorial in The News, October 11, 1999. Also see "JUI to Hit Washington DC Within 8 hours", The News (Internet Version), August 10, 1999.
16. This report notes that Pakistani scholars were not asked to go. Rahimullah Yusufzai, "NWFP Schools Close as Afghan Students Reinforce Taliban", The News (Internet version) August 10, 1999.
17. AFP Report "Taliban Receiving Reinforcements From Pakistan", in FBIS-NES-1999-0814 (Internet version).
18. This delegation was led by Additional Secretary Rustom Shah Mohmand. See, for a report, Dawn, August 25, 1999.
19. The News, October 1, 1999.
20. Frontier Post, September 25, 1999.
21. Marianna Babbar quoting ANP's Bashir Mattha who raised the issue in the Senate, The News, August 14, 1999.
22. "ISI Chief in Routine Business with the CIA", Dawn, September 22, 1999.
23. Kamran Khan, News Intelligence Unit, "Pakistan Government to Confront Militant Outfits", The News, October 8, 1999.
24. "Taliban Asked to Shut Down Terrorist Training Camps," The News, October 8, 1999.
25. "Pakistan Plea to Taliban Reflects Paradigm Shift," The News, October 8, 1999.
26. Khan, n. 15.
27. Pakistani Foreign Ministry sources quoted in The News, (Internet version) October 9, 1999.
28. Sartaj Aziz quoted in The News, October 12, 1999.
29. "Taliban Leader Ready for Talks on Terrorism" AFP in FBIS-NES-1999-1011.
30. n. 15.
31. The News, October 28, 1999.
32. This was reported by Frontier Post, October 10, 1999.
33. The tendency to rely on irregulars can be gleaned from even a cursory study of the Indo-Pakistani Wars. See also Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistani Army (New Delhi: Himalayan Books, 1984).
34. This is noted by B. Raman, "General Musharraf: Past and Present", Institute of Topical Studies, Chennai.
35. Quoted by Brig (retd.) A.R. Siddiqi in The Nation, January 31, 1999.
36. As brought out in Para 13 of Resolution 1214 (1998).
37. Text of Resolution, October 15, 1999, US Department of State, International Information Programmes, <http://www.state-dept.gov.>
38. The Nation, November 10, 1999.
39. "Explosions Rock Islamabad", China Daily, November 13, 1999.
40. Aziz Haniffa, "Pallone Accuses Pak of Complicity in Embassy Bombing" IANS report in Economic Times, November 21, 1999.
41. Lt. General Javed Nasir, "The Islamabad Blasts", The Nation, November 22, 1999.
42. Dawn, November 19, 1999.
43. Flour was selling for Rs. 30 a kg in Afghanistan compared to Rs. 9 in government shops in Pakistan, Dawn, November 22, 1999.
44. Ahmed Rashid, "Afghanistan: Re-Writing the Rules of the Great Game", The News, November 16-19, 1999.
45. Quoted in Dawn, December 12, 1999.
46. Comments and Taliban reactions on the statement, Frontier Post, December 1, 1999.
47. This pressuring is noted by Rahimullah Yusufzai who, however, also notes that the Taliban also pressurised the hijackers. "The Day of The Taliban", The News, January 4, 2000.
48. Mullah Ahmad Jan Ahmadi quoted in The News, December 29, 1999.
49. Washington Post, December 30, 1999.
50. "China Protests to Pakistan Against Training of Terrorists", Frontier Post, January 7, 2000.
51. The News, February 17, 2000.
52. Interestingly, many public seminars addressed by Zelim Khan were also attended by religious representatives from other countries like Naib Amir Ghafoor Ahmed of the Jamaat Islami of Sri Lanka, Frontier Post, February 24, 2000.
53. "Moscow Denounces Pakistani Aid to Taliban", Moscow Interfax, February 29, 2000, in FBIS-SOV-2000-0229.
54. "Saudi Arabia Annoyed at Safe Passage to Militants", Frontier Post, December 30, 1999.
55. "Terrorists in Egypt Using Fake Pakistani Passports", The News, May 6, 1999.
56. Sheehan speaking at Brookings. Quoted by Afzal Khan, "US Charges Osama with Supporting Kashmiris' Struggle," The Nation, February 13, 2000.
57. This seminary is cited as having been set up in 1947 by Allama Yusuf Banuri. This was also the place where Mullah Omar first met Osama bin Laden in 1989. The man heading the great Deobandi jehad is named as Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai in whose name funds are collected for the Harkat-ul-Ansar. The mufti is also cited as the author of the jehad against the US. Khaled Ahmed "In Crisis Only Hawks Will Talk," Friday Times, February 21-27, 2000.
58. Dawn, February 5, 2000.
59. Owais Tohid, "Azhar calls for Jihad Against India First, Then US," AFP, January 6, 2000 in FBIS-NES-2000-0105.
60. See for an excellent report, Arif Jamal, "Biggest Private Army of Islamists in Pakistan", The News, February 20, 2000.
61. This article notes the existence of over a dozen training camps run by the Al-Badr, Hizbul Mujahiden, Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen and the Harkat-ul Jehad Islami in Hazara, Azad Kashmir, Northern Areas, and Afghanistan. However, the "dozen" reported is likely to include only the ones alongside the Indian border and in the Hazaras. M. Ilyas Khan, "Islamic Extremism-The Afghan Connection", The Herald, January 2000.
62. Qazi Hussain speaking at Manchester, The News, April 5, 2000.
63. A few weeks before the military coup, the police arrested more than 500 supporters of four major groups waging jehad against India in Kashmir and raided their offices in various cities. "In several cities, including Lahore, our offices were raided and rumours were rife that the government planned to ban our annual gathering," Abdullah Muntazir spokesman for the Laskhar-e-Taiba, quoted in The News, February 20, 2000.
64. The News, April 11, 2000.
65. Frontier Post, February 2, 2000.
66. These included Abdul Haq (January 12), Abdul Ahad Karzai (July 15) and others who supported the return of King Zahir Shah.
67. Quoted in The News, February 12, 2000.
68. Ahmed Rashid quoted in Andrew Hull, "US Wants Pakistan to Fulfil its Pledges", in Dawn, (Internet edition) March 27, 2000.
69. Ismail Khan, "Terrorists or Crusaders? Newsline, February 2000.
70. Ibid.
71. See Cohen, n. 33. For a discussion of this aspect, see Tara Kartha, "The Mujahideen in Pakistan's Covert War Strategy" in Jasjit Singh, ed., Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir (New Delhi: IDSA, Knowledge World, October 1999).
72. This is alleged by Nawaz Sharif, as well as pointed out by Kamran Khan, "Report Details Sharif-Military Differences", The News, October 13, 1999, p. 1, 10.
73. This was reported by Dawn, January 23, 2000.
74. "Clinton Blames 'Elements' in Pakistan Government for Violence", Dawn, March 23, 2000.
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