Selig S. Harrison
The International Herald Tribune
Thursday, March 8, 2001
WASHINGTON: The key to ending the
threat from Osama bin Laden and the
Taleban does not lie in Afghanistan but in Pakistan, which keeps the Kabul
regime on life support with military and economic aid.
Islamabad also promotes Pakistan-based Islamic extremist groups that have
training camps in Afghanistan and work closely with Mr. bin Laden. The most
important of these, the Lashkar-e-Taiba or Army of the Pure, is an arm of
the Taleban secret police, helping to hunt down enemies of the regime.
Outside Afghanistan it is largely responsible for the recent upsurge of
assassinations of moderate Kashmiris seeking to negotiate peace with India.
Donors of economic aid to Pakistan should actively support enforcement of
UN Security Council Resolution 1333, which went into effect a month ago
calling for an end to military support for the Taleban but did not contain
sanctions for noncompliance. Pakistan has responded predictably by
continuing its military aid while declaring its support for the embargo.
In addition to the establishment of UN monitoring machinery, backed by
sanctions, aid donors should use all of their intelligence capabilities to
do their own monitoring. And the United States should add Lashkar-e-Taiba
to the 27 other groups on its list of "foreign terrorist
organizations."
This would stop short of putting Pakistan on the U.S. list of states
sponsoring terrorism, but it would be a warning that such a step is possible.
In its new Anti-Terrorist Act announced last week, the British government,
after a long internal debate, put Lashkar-e-Taiba on its own list of
terrorist groups.
The Clinton administration debated inconclusively up to its final hours
whether to list it. Such a designation would require a finding by the
Justice Department that the group's activities "threaten the national
security of the United States," including its foreign relations, and that
this threat can be proved in court without the use of secret intelligence.
In November the Justice Department did make the necessary finding. But when
the issue came up at interagency meetings, the CIA objected, arguing that
it needs to maintain its ties with Pakistani intelligence agencies in order
to get the scant information that it does get on Mr. bin Laden. The State
Department's South Asian Bureau also argued that General Pervez Musharraf,
the Pakistani leader, is a moderate doing his best to cooperate on the bin
Laden issue. He would be undermined if he tried to crack down on
Lashkar-e-Taiba, his defenders say, and might be unseatd by a general with
a hard-line Islamic agenda.
This is a fallacious argument because General Musharraf has been unable to
give the United States more than token cooperation on the bin Laden
problem. He is beholden to a dominant clique of Islamic militants among his
fellow generals who have encouraged the growth of Lashkar-e-Taiba to make
it hot for India in Kashmir.
Failing to put the group on the terrorist list gives these hard-liners
carte blanche. Calling a spade a spade would strengthen General Musharraf
in persuading them that future economic aid to Pakistan will be jeopardized
unless it takes action to curb both the Taleban and Pakistan-based
terrorist activity.
The IMF recently gave Pakistan its latest $800 million installment of aid.
Until the government takes effective steps to limit Lashkar-e-Taiba and
allied groups to religious education, the IMF, the United States and other
aid donors should quietly suspend further aid and further rollovers of debt.
Advertising such a step would be a mistake because it would inflame
nationalist sentiment. There are other ways. The IMF can insist that
Pakistan meet its aid criteria, especially with respect to tax collection.
Diplomatic and procedural excuses can be found for stretching out the
timetable for Islamabad's other multilateral aid and for refusing debt
rollovers.
Economic leverage will work only if the donors are patient and united. Over
time, it offers the best and perhaps the only way to solidify a consensus
among pragmatic elements in the armed forces, the bureaucracy and moderate
political forces in Islamabad that terrorism in the name of Islam is
incompatible with Pakistan's survival.
The writer, a senior fellow of The Century Foundation, contributed this
comment to the International Herald Tribune.